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 Using liberal theory, this dissertation examines the behavior of member states in the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), with a focus on middle powers.  In particular, I 
analyze whether trade between middle powers and Latin America and the Caribbean is 
associated with an increase in middle powers’ subscription shares in the IADB.  The analysis 
draws on a cross-sectional time-series data set of capital subscription shares (in log form, and 
first-differenced) for the period of 2004 to 2018.  The results suggest that among all members of 
the IADB, an increase in members’ trade with Latin America and the Caribbean was associated 
with growth in capital subscription shares, on average, during the time-series.  However, the 
interaction term between middle powers and trade was negative and significant, which shows 
that as middle powers’ trade with the region increased, the percentage point change in the log of 
their capital subscriptions in the IADB declined.  The results were robust to different methods for 
coding middle power membership in the IADB.  Additionally, voting affinity between IADB 
members and the U.S. in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) was positive and 
significant, suggesting the possible realist-based influence of the U.S. on other members of the 
IADB, including middle power.  Although the findings for trade among all members is consistent 
with the expectation of liberal theory, the results for middle powers suggests that a more nuanced 
process might be at work.  Possibly, middle powers might reduce growth in their total amount of 
capital subscriptions in the IADB because they view trade as a more effective than multilateral 
aid at promoting mutual gains and poverty alleviation among states in the region.  I also explore 
other possible reasons for the unexpected finding for middle powers and trade.  I offer my 
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Overview of RDBs  
 Regional development banks (RDBs) have become increasingly important in recent 
history.  Due to the rapid economic transformation in Eastern and Southeast Asia, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) has deepened its activities within the region (Bull and Boas, 2003).  
The ADB has pursued an independent role and focused the core of its attention on inclusive 
growth and development.  Poverty reduction and mitigating socioeconomic inequalities have 
become the central themes of ADB policy.  Further, the creation of a very influential department 
known as the Office of Regional Economic Integration (OREI), located within the President’s 
Office, has helped to guide ADB strategy (Kawai, 2005).  Not only does the OREI contain an 
abundance of professional and administrative staff, but its inclusion has raised the ADB’s 
capacity to embrace regional cooperation and integration (RCI) matters in a most complex 
manner.  The new department’s vision is based upon four pillars of activity:  regional and sub-    
regional economic cooperation programs on cross-border infrastructure, trade and investment 
integration, monetary and financial integration, and cooperation in regional public goods (Dent, 
2008).  The anticipated expectation is twofold:  to produce widespread security, and political, 
and economic, cooperation between regional members (Rauniyar and Kanbur, 2010). 
 Similar to the ADB, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) has become more 
involved in Latin America and the Caribbean.  Initially, IADB spending policies were very much 
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orchestrated around social sector lending.  This type of lending was most heavily geared toward 
the region’s smaller and poorer countries (Nelson, 2000).  Economic liberalization and 
integration, however, would eventually assume dominant roles over the bank’s cultural norms.  
Adopting a neoliberal agenda in its lending priorities, then, the IADB’s central aim became 
focused on promoting market-oriented strategies in the attempt to avoid an economic repeat 
(debt crisis associated with ISI) of the 1980s1 (Tussie, 1995).  For the most part, these goals have 
remained right on course.  The IADB’s list of projects and annual reports help to illustrate this 
point.  With this being said, it is easy to see that the far majority of disbursements have been 
invested in infrastructure and economic development (IADB, 2019).     
 Along with the initiative of fostering economic growth, the IADB has not completely 
shunned all means for reducing poverty.  The IADB’s emphasis on poverty reduction has 
become particularly popular in the poorest countries (although it should be noted that Brazil and 
Argentina, the two largest regional donors, are the biggest individual recipients of IADB aid) of 
the region.  They represent roughly a quarter of overall spending (Deruyttere, 1997; IADB, 
2019).  Despite efforts to improve the provision of education and the level of funding for 
emergency crises across these most destitute member states, many gaps (social safety nets for the 
unemployable poor and impact evaluation schemes) remain in place.  The IADB, in turn, has 
claimed that it is trying to better its position regarding socioeconomic inequality (Lustig and 
Deutsch, 1998).  Even in the post-Cold War era, it is argued that one of the IADB’s main goals 
                                                          
1 The word neoliberal is not to be confused with neoliberal institutionalism.  A neoliberal agenda, in this case, is 
referring to free-market policies (i.e. trade liberalization, financial liberalization, privatization, etc.) set forth by the 
Washington Consensus.  Because many Latin American states did not have onerously positive balance of payment 
(BOP) accounts under import substitution industrialization (ISI), their economies were devastated at the onset of the 
1980s debt crisis (see Tussie, 1995).  For clarity purposes, anytime the word neoliberal is used by itself, it will 
represent these tenets of free-market capitalism.  By contrast, any mention of neoliberal institutionalism is done with 
the intent to illustrate international relations (IR) theory.   
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has been to utilize such social sector investment via health and education in order to achieve 
political and security cooperation.  This strategy is in direct response to the growing influence of 
emerging powers such as China and Russia within Latin America (Barria and Roper, 2004). 
 The recent pattern of lending amongst RDBs also highlights the ever-increasing social 
and economic impact of these organizations.  When considering the African Development Bank 
(AfDB), for example, transport expenditures (which represent the largest share of the AfDB’s 
spending portfolio) have already surpassed the bank’s total infrastructure budget for the entire 
first decade (1967-1977) of AfDB existence.  In fact, the cost of the most recent transport project 
being done, known as Phase 2 of the Abidjan Urban Transport Project in Cote D’ Ivorie, exceeds 
AfDB transport expenditures for the first decade alone by roughly $22 million (AfDB, 2018).  
 The IADB has also seen growth in its lending disbursements.  For instance, in 2008, its 
total loan approvals ($11.2 billion) represented a more than 11 percent increase over the amount 
authorized in the previous year.  In 2018, the IADB approved just under $14 billion worth of 
sovereign guaranteed loan projects.  As can be seen, this figure suggests an almost $3 billion 
increase in total loan approvals over a mere decade.  Throughout the first four decades (1960-
2000) of its existence, the IADB approved only 12 projects that cost a net value of $500 million 
or more.  From 2001-2019, the number of projects increased to 77.  Although some of these 
ventures were subsequently cancelled, the fact remains that the IADB has either completed or is 
in the process of completing many multi-million dollar projects (e.g. $1.25 and $1.5 billion 
social investment programs in Colombia and Argentina) (IADB, 2019). 
 Few scholars would doubt the growing significance of RDBs, but the prior research 
literature has tended to focus on the determinants of bank lending, and much of this literature 
was grounded in a structural realist perspective.  The IADB, for example, traces its roots back to 
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the 1950s.  With the U.S. playing the leading role in Latin America, it was often assumed that the 
IADB functioned to serve U.S. security interests by providing resources to buffer against the 
spread of Communism during the Cold War (Retzl, 2015).  Extending the realist notion, the 
ADB – which was created in the 1960s - is often claimed to be dominated by two of its major 
members, the U.S. and Japan.  Although initially used as a bulwark against Communism in Asia, 
the geopolitical stance of the ADB has not changed much in the post-Cold War era.  The reason 
behind the continuation of such realpolitik motives deals in specific relation to the emergence of 
China and India as regional and potential global hegemons (Kilby, 2006).   
 
Theoretical Roles of Middle Powers in RDBs 
 Although there is now a well-developed literature on the determinants of RDB lending, 
there has been comparatively less attention given to other dimensions of bank governance.  IR 
scholars, for instance, have recognized the role of middle powers.2  It remains unclear, however, 
why middle powers join RDBs.  Perhaps more important, although many middle powers have 
increased their subscription share of RDBs in recent years, the literature on this topic remains 
scant.  As a result, we know little about the motivations of middle powers in RDBs.  In this 
                                                          
2 According to IR scholars, middle powers are recognizable by their foreign policy behavior.  These authors look at 
less constitutive features and more toward the proclivity of such states to engage in multilateral decision-making 
regarding international problems (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 1993).  Others focus on state capacity alone.  This 
term can be used to imply the extent at which a state realizes its own will (Holbraad, 1984).  For some, the global 
political economy is what ultimately determines middle power status.  States that are positioned around the median 
income level receive such classification (Cox and Sinclair, 1996).  For the purpose of this dissertation, I amalgamate 
all of these classifications into one working definition.  This topic will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 4.  
With such a definition in place, examples of middle power states consist of China, South Africa, Mexico, the 




dissertation, I seek to fill this gap in the literature.  In particular, I will examine why middle 
power states increase (or decrease) their capital subscriptions in the RDBs to which they belong.   
 A study of changes in the capital shares of middle powers within RDBs can contribute to 
theoretical debates in IR.  In particular, the study has the potential to challenge the conventional 
wisdom of previous literature, which has often proceeded from a structural realist perspective.  
Prior scholarship has argued that middle powers are influenced by signaling, inducements, or 
coercion of regional hegemonic powers within RDBs.  However, if middle powers in RDBs are 
not simply reacting to cues from regional hegemons, we may need to refine claims about the 
dominance of hegemonic states within regional and international banks.  This dissertation can 
also contribute to recent theoretical debates about the rise of China, including China’s entry into 
RDBs.  A finding that middle powers and hegemonic states are cooperating in this area may also 
imply that China’s recent entry in some RDBs will be smoother than anticipated.  On a further 
note, it is important to emphasize the practical or policy benefit of the study.  Namely, it may 
improve our understanding of governance in RDBs as a whole. 
 
Liberal Argument and Explanations  
 My argument can be summarized in the following way.  As overall trade increases 
between middle powers and countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region, I expect 
middle power states to increase their capital subscription shares in the IADB.3  Surprisingly, the 
                                                          
3 The definition of capital subscription shares can entail many different components.  On one hand, for instance, the 
word capital subscriptions might be used to refer to the total amount of weighted votes or percentage of weighted 
votes that a member country possesses in an RDB, such as the IADB.  For the purpose of this dissertation, however, 
I turn to a simpler definition.  Because capital subscription shares are directly reflective of actual foreign aid 
commitments, I substitute them for multilateral assistance.  This matter will be discussed more thoroughly in 
Chapter 4.    
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findings run contrary to my expectations.  Middle powers’ subscription shares actually decline 
when their level of trade goes up in Latin America and the Caribbean.  The reason why I 
hypothesize this to be the case, however, is that as middle power states’ economies become more 
integrated within the region as a whole, they have more incentive to promote growth and 
development as it is mutually beneficial for their economies and for the developing countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean.  This level of economic betterment is significant for boosting 
personal gain while reducing problems both at home and abroad.   
 Beyond trade, an increase in middle power activities in RDBs may indirectly promote the 
activities of middle power firms across the region.  With more regional and sub-regional 
connectivity, multinational corporations (MNCs) from middle power states are given the 
opportunity to invest in Latin America.  The lending activities of RDBs can help to create a well-
educated and functioning workforce in host economies, which is mutually beneficial to both 
firms and the host economy.  On the one hand, with a more educated workforce, multinational 
firms can realize improvements in labor productivity and exports back to middle power 
economies.  On the other hand, workers in the host economy gain additional training and 
managerial know-how from their employment.  As ordinary citizens and firms seek to maximize 
their own individual utility, such neoliberal-led development is believed to promote economic 
development within the host economy.   
 As mentioned above, the external environment is also of utmost importance to middle 
power states.  For instance, while poverty reduction and lessening socioeconomic inequality 
facilitate the standard of living for the entire populace, this activity appears to be of critical 
importance in the developing world, where it has been associated with political violence.  One 
prominent example of such a claim in recent history is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
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Colombia (FARC).  An insurgent group premised on addressing high levels of inequality in 
Colombia, the FARC presented itself as a very substantial fighting force that spanned over five 
decades.  Although FARC may be domestic in orientation and goals, formidable non-state 
organizations or networks can also pose the potential threat of international terrorist activity. 
 It is for these reasons that I put forth a liberal argument.  With state preferences being the 
same, middle powers have strong incentives to try and maximize their own benefits and the 
interests of developing states.  Whether the benefits are economic, political, or social in nature, 
the point is that they may desire outcomes which converge with those of the U.S. hegemon.  The 
behavior of middle power states across the IADB, and international organizations (IOs) in 
general, thus may be driven by endogenous preferences of middle powers rather than coercion.  
Moving forward, I proceed throughout this dissertation in the following manner. 
 
Conclusion   
 Chapter II will encompass the literature review.  It is here that I intend to discuss RDBs 
and their specificities.  The primary aspects that I aim to incorporate are a brief description of 
some of the banks themselves (i.e. IADB, AfDB, and ADB) and previous theories explaining 
their behavior.  In particular, I think it important to understand how member states operate within 
these banks and what motives or factors encourage them to vote in certain ways.   
 Chapter III will include the theory section.  I use this chapter with the intent to offer a 
more thorough explanation and detail about liberalism as a whole.  Once I have given a full-
fledged account of this theoretical approach, I plan to relay it to my argument at hand.  It is in 
this manner that I demonstrate how the liberal framework might possibly determine middle 
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power behavior within the IADB.  Most importantly, perhaps, is that this description and 
analysis be connected to a broader theme which consists of IO member states in general. 
 Chapter IV will entail data and methodology.  This chapter is meant to highlight all 
variables and the methodology.  Additionally, the type of coding is depicted and explained in 
further detail.  I provide even more insight by stating why I selected these certain variables 
(along with where they came from) and methodology.  It is through this section that I seek to 
derive the answer to my research question. 
 Chapter V will address the results and analysis section.  It is here that each linear 
regression model shall be displayed and explained.  For each specific model, I intend to give a 
full description at its own account.  Using such statistically driven mechanisms and strategies, I 
transition to an analytical discussion.  After the results have been finalized, in other words, I put 
forth my own interpretation.  It is in this way that I can best describe the correlation between 
intra/interregional trade and capital subscriptions.    
 Chapter VI will be strictly oriented around the conclusion.  Once I have presented these 
results and interpretations from my perspective, I will offer my final remarks.  They shall look to 
provide an immediate answer to the theoretical underpinning at hand and any current or future 
policy implications that may be tied into this research agenda.  With this being said, I intend to 
show why liberalism may be more theoretically applicable (both within IOs and throughout the 






Theory and Literature Review 
 
Introduction  
 Many different theoretical perspectives exist on why states behave the way they do in the 
international order.  Ranging from more rational choice based paradigms (i.e. realism, liberalism, 
some forms of constructivism) to those that are postmodern (i.e. some forms of constructivism, 
critical theory, and post-structural theory), cooperation and discord amongst states can be 
explained using a wide array of theoretical frameworks.  Given the empirical aims of this 
dissertation, it seems best to merely focus on the theories that incorporate rational choice 
precepts into their agenda.  The postmodern theories, in other words, are not well suited for the 
direction of this paper.   
 In addition to the general utility of IR theory alone, middle power states serve as the 
primary unit of interest for the analysis.  Rather than rely on hegemonic stability theory as a 
universal predictor of international regimes, I use competing explanations to offer an account of 
how it is often in the direct interest of middle power states to either conform to or revise the 
status quo.4  It is their own choices, thus, that determine the outcome of international behavior.  
Since this dissertation is primarily linked to the study of middle powers across the IADB, but yet 
                                                          
4 Status quo refers to the international regimes and rules set forth by a hegemon/s.  In the contemporary world, the 
status quo represents the U.S.’s neoliberal (Washington Consensus) agenda.  Middle power and emerging states can 
either accept (as they reap rewards via mutual gains) the status quo for what it is, or, they might aim to revise it with 
their own systemic goals and policies (see Gilpin, 1987).  
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includes other lesser power states into the analysis, I find it pertinent to both isolate and relate 
their actions across IOs as a whole.  I proceed into this chapter by initially discussing the 
rationalist based theoretical perspectives on international regimes and cooperation before moving 
into how they apply to middle powers in IOs and, more specifically, to states in RDBs.         
 
Structural Realism  
 Traditional realists view international regimes as epiphenomenal (Carr, 1939).  That 
being said, these scholars actually observe the presence of formal organizations (UN, IMF, WB, 
WTO) and informal arrangements.  Their claims are simple.  Any cooperation that takes place 
amongst participant members is superficial (Gruber, 2000).  Hegemons are solely responsible for 
setting the agenda and lesser powers will abide by superior demands with or without the 
enactment of institutions.  Current regimes, in other words, only serve as by-products for U.S. 
grand strategy (Charrette and Sterling-Folker, 2018).  This phenomenon is often referred to as 
structural power.  Although the U.S. may have lost some of its relative power over the last few 
decades (as a result of the rise of the European Union (EU), Japan, China, and other emerging 
powers), it has continued to maintain the world order, which is economically neoliberal  
(Strange, 1987). 
 While most contemporary realists agree with this stance, it is only to a certain degree.  
For instance, while many believe that international regimes are highly irrelevant in matters of 
security, others claim this is not so much the case with regard to economics (Keohane, 1984).  In 
the former sense, regimes are nothing more than intervening variables between power and 
cooperation.  This reality helps explain why the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has 
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expanded and still exists despite many of its members not meeting their financial obligations.  
The U.S., basically, has allowed these countries to renege on their duties for the purpose of 
maintaining a widespread security alliance (Mearsheimer, 1994).  From an economic 
perspective, however, regimes actually provide substance by serving as informational guidelines 
among participant members.  It is argued that such functions help to explain the longevity of 
institutions such as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which evolved into the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.  On this view, thus, cooperation is not due to U.S. 
hegemony, and the U.S. cannot force other countries into compliance.  Rather, the existence of 
cooperation stems from state preferences that reflect their imminent and long-term national 
interests as much as U.S. interests (Krasner, 1982). 
 
Liberal and Neoliberal Perspectives  
 Moving away from realism, liberals see international regimes as indicative of state 
preferences.  At the domestic level, different actors (including transnational firms) compete 
against one another in hope of obtaining political outcomes that meet their interests (Moravcsik, 
1997).  When these preferences or interests are parallel across states, regimes tend to emerge.  
International regimes, thus, happen to appear in a variety of ways (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999).  
For instance, one might look at regional regimes on fisheries and licensing agreements for deep 
seabed mining as notable examples here.  It is said that if these arrangements are not set in place, 
national firms will overuse the resources at hand.  The long-term interests of firms, then, become 
jeopardized as prices decrease from surplus production and as natural resources are depleted or 
inch near extinction (leading to a situation where all firms are worse off) (Young, 1989). 
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 As noted above, regimes may also emerge as a direct result of transnational influences on 
domestic governance (Litfin, 1994).  In the era of globalization, this pattern has become 
particularly popular relative to epistemic communities.  Since these latter entities tend to be 
composed of specialized and professional bureaucrats, states often absorb their knowledge and, 
therefore, convert this information into preferences (Hopkins, 1992).  Sufficient evidence of such 
a claim is portrayed via the Mediterranean Plan.  A cohort of knowledgeable ecologists 
(epistemic community) asserted their environmental concerns (declining ecosystem, increased 
pollution, and minimization of the dolphin population) onto policymakers within the participant 
states.  These latter existences responded by adopting the Plan with the intent to reduce such 
ecological problems through their obedience to the regime (Haas, 1989).   
 Further insight has been placed onto this matter.  Epistemic communities are also 
believed to exist amongst neoclassical economists (Kapstein, 1992).  As they adapt and learn 
new information, such messages are relayed to hegemonic states.  Once other member states 
consume this knowledge, they integrate it into policy-making across their respected international 
organization/s (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990).  The World Bank is used as an example here.  
When the Marshall Plan went into effect in 1947, the original purpose (providing loans to 
Western Europe) of the World Bank was no longer relevant.  Professional staff members 
responded by persuading its leading governments (U.S. and Great Britain) that poverty reduction 
goals needed to be implemented throughout the developing world.  These Western powers 
followed such requests and made Third World poverty reduction into a regime (Haas, 1990). 
 Another form of non-conflictual liberal cooperation exists between democratic and 
autocratic governments.  On one account, it is noted how both forms of government share the 
same preferences when considering certain economic issue areas (Hankla and Kuthy, 2013).  An 
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additional example of this reality might be located within the environmental (climate change) 
realm.  Although signatory countries to multilateral agreements like Kyoto Protocol and the Paris 
Agreement have set their target goals (which often have not been met) at different levels, they, 
nonetheless, seemingly demonstrate why addressing such universal issues are more important 
than governmental regime types alone.  Despite such ideological differences that exist in other 
(governmental regime type and human rights) issue areas, democracies and autocracies, in this 
sense, strive to reach some sort of environmental cooperation with one another (Held, 2010). 
 Transitioning from liberalism to neoliberal institutionalism, some important points of 
departure deserve notice.  Under the latter theory, there are multiple channels of independent 
actors (states, firms, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), IOs, etc.).  Neoliberal 
institutionalists, in other words, believe that non-state beings are not required to behave through 
the state alone (Keohane and Nye, 1977).  These former entities are as equally motivated by 
rational outcomes and utility gains.  Given that all types of global actors often reap similar 
benefits from mutually inclusive (whether this be economic, political, or security) 
interdependence, international regimes are created to offer them some kind of substance 
(Axelrod and Keohane, 1984).  As interactions are iterated over time in what becomes known as 
a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, transaction costs are lowered and information becomes overly 
abundant.  Levels of expectation, thus, can now be anticipated amongst each participating 
member (Axelrod, 1984).  The emergence of GATT (although now replaced by the WTO) is 
used to illustrate an example here.  Since member states believed that they would all benefit 
(absolute gains) from such an arrangement, the rational approach was to fully embrace 
themselves with this hegemonic creation.  GATT, therefore, served as a legitimate and non-
coercive international trade regime (Keohane, 1984). 
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 While not digressing too much from these analyses, some further light can be shed onto 
this matter.  Although different actors may indeed share certain interests, they are also likely to 
defect when the size of the group becomes too large (Olson, 1965).  Larger N-groups, in other 
words, are more apt to defect because they possess the option to free-ride.  As additional players 
enter the contest, it becomes much harder and costly for states to detect and punish defection 
(Oye, 1985).  When numbers cannot be reduced, however, the most efficient strategy appears to 
be promoting cooperation through international regimes.  Well-established rules and collective 
enforcement of violated principles offer some form of guidance and response mechanisms 
(Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1996).  There is evidence at hand to support the crux of 
such an argument.  For instance, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has well beyond 
100 active members.  Initially, this body had little enforcement power and, therefore, was 
ineffective in its punishment against oil discharge violators.  As it suddenly changed its stance 
and transitioned to the implementation of potent sanctions (license removal and port detainment 
for equipment regime violations), participant members became much more compliant (Downs, 
Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996). 
 According to other neoliberal institutionalists, group size and enforcement mechanisms 
alone cannot determine compliance with international regimes.  They allude to the significance 
that underlies the nature of a game and its potential costs (Schwarzer, 1998).  Specific mention is 
made of suasion tactics and the formulation of sanctioning regimes.  While some states may 
agree regarding action (sanctions) that ought to be taken against other states, they would rather 
let their allies pursue such action as it could be detrimental to their own economic interests.  On 
the other hand, although a leading power would like to see its allies supplementing such action 
(sanctions), it, nevertheless, may decide to act alone as non-sanctioning could produce severe 
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(threat to security) consequences.  To further enhance the chances of cooperation amongst other 
actors, then, this central sanctioning state must find a way to commit itself.  It can do so through 
raising audience costs (Martin, 1993).  As the dominant actor is able to garner profound 
coalitional support at the domestic level, the political costs of reneging (as the central state can 
impose countersanctions on its allies) multiply by a significant amount.  This means that it 
becomes very costly for the international counterpart to restrain from upholding the regime.  If 
the situation is vice-versa, and no widespread consensus seems to be present, then the costs of 
reneging (primary sanction state) and noncompliance (other state) are much lower (Zurn, 1992).  
The effectiveness of international regimes, thus, are not solely dependent on numbers and 
enforcement.  In this case, the cost-benefit analyses of each participant member holds greatest 
weight (Noehrenberg, 1995). 
 Similar, yet distinct comparisons can be made against the nature of such sanctioning 
regimes when placing competing outlooks into perspective.  Other neoliberal institutionalists, 
indeed, agree that group size and enforcement power only matter so much for compliance 
(Lipson, 1984).  The divergence between them and those mentioned above, however, stems from 
the type of cost-benefit calculations at hand.  Whereas the preceding institutionalists present an 
image that produces various (sometimes compliance and sometimes not pending the audience 
costs) results, these alternate claims suggest that uniformity in behavior and more stable regimes 
are possible (Zangl, 1994).  Compliance with the international monetary regime is listed as a 
notable example here.  Such cooperation might best be explained by market pressure rather than 
centralized forces (such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)) alone.  Member countries, in 
other words, are willing to oblige themselves to this particular institutional arrangement.  This 
strategy is believed to enhance their overall economic well-being in the face of an ever-growing 
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interdependent world.  Restrictive violations (i.e. capital controls or a fixed exchange rate) 
merely serve to damage one’s reputation.  It can be said, then, that member countries submit to 
the IMF’s Articles of Agreement under their own discretion.  An international monetary regime, 
therefore, exists across all relevant actors without the need of coercion and independent from 
group size (Simmons, 2000).          
 For other neoliberal institutionalists, international regimes only matter so much as actors’ 
rational goals continue to be met.  If the status quo of a regime, in other words, is no longer 
suitable to preferred outcomes, actors will more than likely abandon or defect from them (Stein, 
1983).  Resorting to IOs, it has been argued that whenever the UN Security Council (UNSC) 
enacts decisions (whether it be through resolutions or vetoes) that counter the U.S. position, the 
latter entity purposefully violates its Chapter VII obligations in order to promote its individual 
interests.  By contrast, some institutionalists see IOs as instigators of regimes.  They claim that 
the international human rights regime came into fruition because of state interaction within IOs.  
Once this foundation was set, crises reactions (as they allude to NATO intervention in former 
Yugoslavia) could be anticipated amongst the participant members (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). 
  
Constructivism 
 According to constructivists, international regimes are a product of social interaction 
processes (Hopf, 1998).  With that being said, the many different actors (states, firms, NGOs, 
IOs) that constitute the global system are ultimately responsible for determining regime 
formation.  As ideas are disseminated through personal or collective engagement, interests 
become mutual (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001).  Such interests, then, take the shape of what 
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receives acceptance as commonly understood and valued norms.  Since norms cannot be fixed 
and often change with new interactive exchanges over time, international regimes may fluctuate 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).  It is for this exact reason that the concept of anarchy must not 
be limited to a pure materialist interpretation.  Due to their ability to self-reflect, various 
international actors are bound to adjust status quo viewpoints in favor of newer intersubjective 
meaning.  Regimes, in this sense, might pursue a multitude of lifeforms or existences throughout 
the course of history (Wendt, 1999). 
 Not digressing too far from this theoretical agenda, other constructivists offer some 
additional light.  They categorize this type of behavior as something known as “speech acts” 
(Duffy and Frederking, 2009).  This terminology simply indicates what actors might be able to 
expect of each other’s behavior without actually being influenced into an identity shift.  If 
preferences are the same, then actors will either verbally or legally (via treaty) assert themselves 
in accordance to some predictable sort of outcome (Kratochwil, 1991).  Although not in 
complete discord with this prior assumption, an extra element can be inserted into the “speech 
acts” equation.  It is claimed that “speech acts” can also provide a net distributional benefit to 
each participating member.  By living up to their declared commitments, in other words, actors 
will reap the imminent rewards of cooperation and, therefore, grant international regimes full 
legitimacy (Onuf, 2012). 
 Some constructivists are notable for discussing how international regimes manifest 
amongst different actors (Klotz, 1995).  On one hand, this notion is divulged through the state.  It 
is said that as many Western countries witnessed a socially constructed transition from warfare to 
welfare state, they began to develop humanitarian identities.  National security, thus, could now 
be premised on human rights regimes instead of competitive materialism.  In fact, it is this type 
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of constructivist wisdom that explains why the Western states (via UN resolutions and NATO) 
led two expeditions into former Yugoslavia (Katzenstein, 1996).  Although the same principle, 
other constructivists focus more toward economic (monetary and trade) regimes.  The stated 
ideal of embedded liberalism (free market capitalism with capital controls, adjustable fixed pegs, 
trade restrictions, and other forms of opportunistic government intervention) was a socially 
created phenomenon between Western states resulting from welfare ideologies and similar 
historical (Great Depression) experience.  Certain scholars have claimed that these latter ideals 
are what caused Western states to prop up post-World War II economic institutions (IMF, WB, 
and GATT) founded in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire (Ruggie, 1982). 
 In addition to states, constructivists have also investigated regime formation at the IO 
level (Jupille, Caporaso, and Checkel, 2003).  For instance, some point at how environmental 
regimes developed within the World Bank.  They say that the advocacy of transnational 
networks and NGOs induced the organization to adopt an Inspection Panel.  It would (at least 
supposedly) be used as an accountability mechanism to ascertain that Bank funded projects do 
not contribute to environmental hazards and degradation (Park, 2005).  Complementing this 
analysis, others have inspected transparency regimes across different IOs.  It is argued that while 
transparency regimes do not exist in some entities, they do in others.  The logic is simple.  Since 
certain organizations (such as NATO and the EU) consist of member states that have diverging 
interests on transparency matters, no accord and, therefore, regime can be formulated.  By 
contrast, because an IO such as the Council of Europe (C of E) does, indeed, embed Freedom of 
Information (FOI) laws into its constitution it helps to establish and legitimize transparency as a 




Theoretical Explanations on Middle Power Behavior in IOs 
 Having reviewed the general theoretical perspectives, I turn now to a discussion of the 
research literature that is specific to middle powers and IOs.  One explanation as to why middle 
power or emerging states join IOs is for the purpose of balancing (Krasner, 1985).  According to 
this view, middle powers aim to reap the economic benefits of such multilateral aid 
disbursements.  Be it through trade or investment, middle powers can use their resources to forge 
political alliances with one another (Pape, 2005).  This strategy provides a means to enhance 
security against the relative power of a global hegemon.  Cooperation, thus, serves as nothing 
more than a path for promoting the self-interest (an economically and politically induced security 
agenda) of these middle power states (Waltz, 2000). 
 Expanding upon this realist notion, it is said that emerging powers enter into IOs due to 
the spoiler effect.  Such states, in other words, have the opportunity to act as free riders (Lake, 
1983).  Due to the overbearing costs (whether it be financial or transaction) of maintaining world 
order, hegemons are placed at a relative disadvantage against their middle power counterparts.  
While the former entities are compelled to invest ample time and resources into upholding global 
stability, emerging states utilize their ever-increasing economic base to foster domestic growth 
(Jervis, 1982).  As middle power states reach a point of ascent, they can begin to apply pressure 
and, thus, challenge the international order.  Ultimately, they look to change the status quo more 
in line with their own particular interests (Gilpin, 1987). 
 Another theoretical perspective dealing with middle power behavior across IOs is the 
notion of cooptation.  More aligned with neoliberal institutionalist theory, cooptation goes hand-
in-hand with the idea of authentic cooperation (Hurrell, 2006).  Hegemons, for example, 
integrate rising challengers into prestigious IO roles at the behest of maintaining the status quo 
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(liberal world order).  Being that such emerging countries reap many of the same rewards 
(economic growth) as do ruling hegemons from this liberal world order, they have no incentive 
to change it.  Middle power states, in other words, are engaged in an international sphere of 
absolute gains and, therefore, have very similar interests to those of their hegemonic counterparts 
(Keohane, 2002).  It is in this sense that such emerging states are likely to cooperate with 
hegemons.  Instead of attempting to balance against greater powers or acting as revisionary 
states, middle power states aim to further their own prospects by maximizing utility in IOs 
(Ikenberry and Wright, 2008). 
 Further highlighting this institutionalist conviction, it is said that middle powers act as 
compromisers in IOs.  By appeasing the demands of hegemons, these states garner a favorable 
reputation (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 1993).  They are, then, able to assume more influence 
(using political alliances and their coherent institutional loyalty) and exert momentous pressure 
onto the status quo.  Being that middle powers are primarily committed to an established world 
order and do not want to risk jeopardizing their international status or legitimacy, they strictly 
seek to enact an insignificant dose of revisionary change (Keohane, 1969).  The problem with 
this strategy, however, is that extolling any kind of institutional revisionism can ultimately lead 
to a weakening and potential demise of the status quo altogether.  An emerging power such as 
Brazil provides a concrete example.  Given that it has abounded by the Western “rules” of the 
game, Brazil has developed a likeable identity and become well-respected across the global 
arena.  Even more important, perhaps, is that this emerging power has gained much utility 
(economic, political, security) under the neoliberal umbrella.  It would, thus, be foolish for Brazil 
to abandon its more grandeur interests in pursuit of less significant alterations (Lopes, Casaroes, 
and Gama, 2013). 
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 The neoliberal institutionalist framework also provides much explanatory substance aside 
from cooptation.  For instance, middle powers rely on rules and institutions to help lower 
transaction costs, create information, and develop a tide of expectations (Martin, 1992).  These 
structural enhancement type mechanisms, in turn, offer middle power states an easy and 
predictable avenue for forwarding their interests.  From this angle, it can be said that emerging or 
middle power states do not merely use IOs as a means of cooptation.  Rather than attempt to 
implement any revisionary (via legitimacy and dependability) role, middle power behavior is 
premised more on upholding the status quo.  Since they are the systemic beneficiaries of such an 
order, these states have no genuine incentive to change it (Ikenberry, 2008).  A notable example 
here is China.  As this emerging power has largely (both economically and politically) gained 
from its inclusion in the Western-centered international system, IOs only serve to facilitate the 
Chinese position.  China, in other words, seeks to continue maximizing its utility by living 
accordingly with robust and coherent IO rule-based agendas (Zheng and Zhang, 2012).                 
 Not digressing too much from neoliberal institutionalism, the liberal approach explains 
IO affiliation as being based on preference (i.e. Japanese pursuit of preferred whaling policies via 
vote-buying in the International Whaling Commission (IWC)) enhancement (Strand and Tuman, 
2012).  Middle powers, thus, seek to promote their own individual interests (mutual gains) by 
distributing resources to IOs that fulfill stately obligations (Lim and Vreeland, 2013).  This 
supposed reality seems to be particularly true when considering the advent of the BRICS-led 
New Development Bank (NDB).  Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa suggested the 
NDB’s formation in order to better their infrastructural investment prospects.  Due to such a 
large gap (stemming from higher industrialization and demand) in development financing, these 
emerging powers see the NDB as a tool to forward national interests like infrastructure spending 
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and economic growth (Chin, 2014).  A very similar dynamic can be used to highlight the 
extended network of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) middle power states.  For 
instance, New Zealand, Australia, South Korea, and ample EU countries have joined the AIIB 
despite U.S. opposition.  As these Western entities look to become more economically engaged 
with China and the Asian region in general, AIIB membership offers an avenue for furthering 
state preferences (Callaghan and Hubbard, 2016). 
 The liberal approach can also be understood in terms of internationalism.  With that being 
said, middle power states invest their resources in IOs with the intent to advance a multilateral 
world order (Rudderham, 2008).  Since they do not possess the required hard power or material 
capacity, middle powers resort to IOs in pursuit of establishing global ideals.  Individual state 
preferences, of course, still matter.  When these interests become well-aligned (as is often 
anticipated with traditional middle powers) across IO settings, though, they are expected to take 
on a more internationalist (rather than nationalist) role (Matthew, 2003).  Japan, Canada, 
Australia, and the Netherlands serve as classic examples in this regard.  Each of these middle 
power states have actively engaged in the Ottawa Process to ban anti-personnel landmines, the 
comprehensive test ban regime, the chemical weapons convention, and the UN Conference on 
Disarmament (Colijn, 2004).     
 From a constructivist perspective, it can be said that middle or emerging powers use IOs 
as a way to promote their interests through social interaction (Nye, 2004).  Being that many of 
these states are committed to the neoliberal world order, there is no need to disrupt this status 
quo by pursuing hardline military tactics.  Instead, middle power states seek to achieve their 
revisionary goals through the imposition (via iterated social engagements) of soft influence (Li 
and Worm, 2011).  In fact, a rising middle power like Turkey has attempted to follow such an 
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overarching aim.  With global governance issues (most notably humanitarian crises) that 
immediately impact it on the ascent, Turkey plans to reach its desired political outcomes by 
channeling persuasive dialogue and strategically utilizing its long-term membership across 
hegemonic-led IOs (Dal and Gok, 2014). 
 Another constructivist angle focuses on the initial willpower of middle powers to dilute 
hegemonic influence.  Without the formation and presence of IOs, in other words, the likelihood 
of the U.S. or Great Britain imprinting middle power states with their own foreign policy ideals 
becomes much higher.  This phenomenon is especially true in the case of Canada.  Using the UN 
umbrella (Western-led IOs) as a diversionary tactic, Canada has been able to ward off any value-
based leverage that does not conform to its own (Fox, 1996).  Once it mitigated the adoptive 
opportunity or essentially rid itself of such unwanted interests, Canada transitioned into a norm 
entrepreneur and diffuser.  Aside from more general human security (ban on land mines, controls 
on small arms proliferation and child soldiers, eliminating gender inequality) issues, this middle 
power was a critical advocate for supporting and creating the International Criminal Court (ICC).    
The fact that the U.S. is not a state party to this IO sheds even further light when regarding the 
norm-led significance of middle powers like Canada (Howard and Neufeldt, 2000). 
 The constructivist approach is most suitable for explaining middle power behavior from a 
nuanced ideational standpoint.  What this means, basically, is that middle power states premise 
their IO actions on self-identity or perception (Wendt, 1994).  When these states quit believing 
(whether this be motivated by their own lack of willpower/interests or reactionary to the loss of 
status imposed upon them) that they elicit any type of critical meaning in IO decision-making 
procedures, a social deconstruction process emerges.  Consequently, these particular middle 
powers are likely to perform limited niches in their current IOs and become dissuaded in joining 
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future IOs.  The same can be said the other way around.  As middle power states have their 
international statuses boosted and legitimized, they socially reconstruct themselves into more 
pragmatically engaged role players (Schimmelfennig, 2003).  A notable example of such claims 
is Canada and Australia in the Asia-Pacific region.  Since the former state has been politically 
marginalized (due to a failed bid to the UNSC and lack of invitations to the East Asia Summit 
(EAS) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers Meeting 
(ADMM)) at both the international and regional level, it no longer identifies or, therefore, 
attempts to serve as an essential body within the Asia-Pacific IO context.  Australia, on the other 
hand, being wholly integrated into the EAS and ADMM spheres of influence, has reshaped its 
meaning of middle power.  It, thus, has assumed a more proactive stance across the Asia-Pacific 
realm (Bezglasnyy, 2013). 
  
Theoretical Literature on RDBs  
 Aside from the previously aforementioned literature, other realist-based studies have 
hinted at U.S. dominance within the organization with respect to internal voting dynamics.  For 
instance, the voting structure of the IADB is based on a weighted system.  Since the U.S. 
occupies roughly 30 percent of votes, it is deemed to hold a significant amount of decision-
making power (DeWitt, 1987).  This argument has been furthered by investigating the effects of 
relative voting power.  It has been declared, in other words, that U.S. leverage is not so much a 
product of its voting weight, but rather its ability to substantively determine the outcomes of 
coalition alignment (Strand, 2003). 
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 Piggybacking onto the abovementioned realist perspectives, it is worth noting that the 
U.S. holds effective veto power over certain policy (i.e. constitutional amendments) decisions.  
In respect to its vast shareholder status, this reality is particularly true in the IADB.  It can be 
assumed that the U.S. has exerted an excessive amount of leverage over the steady capital 
accumulation procedures and subsequent funding conditions that have taken place in response 
(being there a higher borrowing member country (BMC) demand for developmental assistance) 
to the 2008-2009 global financial crisis (Nelson, 2011).  As the U.S. Congress controls the power 
of the purse, it wields high authority in ascertaining that RDB decision-making meets its own 
criteria.  Due to the fact that local constituents have minimal (if any) knowledge or concern 
about international financial institutions (IFIs) as a whole, congressional interests tend to be 
shaped by pluralist (civil society) groups.  Since the U.S. exercises such considerable influence 
within most RDBs, it is able to sway member states into adopting many of these preferred 
policies (Babb, 2009).        
 Using a liberal framework, the most central objective, perhaps, is to look at the 
institutional design and incentive structure of RDBs.  If the governance model delegates any kind 
of consequential authority to member states, then it can be said that power (although 
disproportionate) is shared (Gutner, 2002).  On this note, it is worth mentioning that the majority 
of IADB ownership is possessed by Latin American BMCs.  These BMCs, in other words, are 
also integral to the overall lending process.  In fact, the U.S. has been shown to demonstrate 
insignificant informal influence over other member states (Bland and Kilby, 2015).  IADB social 
lending has increased dramatically as domestic and bilateral social expenditures amongst 
industrialized states (U.S. and EU) have remained stagnant.  Without coalitional consensus, 
financial packages cannot be delivered to recipient states.  It must be assumed, then, that lending 
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decisions are not only a mere reflection of hegemonic or great power interests, but lesser power 
preferences (whether they be economic, political, security, or ideological) as well (Lyne, Nielson 
and Tierney, 2009). 
 Other research has pointed out the core assumptions that can be made from scrutinizing 
such an institutional context.  It has been suggested, for example, that the U.S., Japan, and 
dictatorial rulers (i.e. Indonesia, China, Germany, etc.) of syndicates (coalitional blocs) possess 
all formal voting power within the ADB.  The fact that lesser powers continue to commit 
themselves to such dominance and heighten their lack of prestige suggests that they must be 
receiving some sort of preferential outcome (Strand, 1999).  Furthering this argument even more, 
it is not denied that the U.S. has utilized its weighted position in order to achieve economic 
(along with security and political) interests within the Asian region.  Of equal importance, 
however, is the notion that middle power states such as Japan and Australia have also used their 
own relative power in the ADB to better economic prospects.  Multilateralism, thus, serves as a 
channel for fostering both hegemonic and emerging preferences alike (Dutt, 1997).  
 Adding to the liberal perspective, researchers have extended their investigation into what 
types of state preferences motivate RDB lending behavior.  Of course, differences (i.e. the AfDB 
being much more committed to poverty alleviation than ADB) are bound to exist across each 
RDB.  It can be noted, however, that the main commonality is sustainable development via 
regional integration (Culpeper, 1994).  For instance, it is argued that the ADB provides more 
environmentally risky aid to countries with better past performance standards.  This reality does 
not imply that recipients with low results absorb fewer overall disbursements.  By contrast, they 
actually receive more non-risk funding (Buntaine, 2011).  To better this argument, other scholars 
have utilized econometric analyses and statistical data.  Within the IADB, green expenditures 
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represented a mere 23% of overall spending from 2007-2016.  Although shareholder countries 
that exhibit sufficient environmental performance appear to receive the highest amount of green 
allocation over time, it is still not enough to fill a significant gap in this area.  While these 
findings do reveal the intensified nature of strict economic development measures, the fact that 
almost one-fourth of IADB output goes toward the environment indicates that at least some 
member states have fairly robust green/climate interests (Yuan and Gallagher, 2018). 
 Looking at state preferences from a purely economic standpoint, it is claimed that RDBs 
spend more on less populous and wealthy countries.  With the exception of the IADB (which 
places ample emphasis on social sector spending), the aim of RDB disbursements is to foster 
economic growth via vast infrastructure investment in these less fortunate states (Neumayer, 
2003).  On the other hand, it is argued that state preferences may actually lay with increasing the 
development of newly industrialized countries (NICs).  As such middle-income states seek to 
promote their economic advancement, they require heavier financial commitments in lesser 
developed areas.  Poorer segments of these NICs, in other words, are just as (if not more) needy 
than more impoverished countries as a whole (Birdsall, Vanzetti, and de Cordoba, 2006).  
 The liberal notion of state preferences might be taken even one step closer when 
considering primary RDB objectives.  For instance, within the IADB it is stated that contingent 
valuation (CV), a type of cost-benefit economic approach, is most efficient for promoting 
environmental enhancement amongst member states in general.  While improving environmental 
conditions is important, this can only matter so much as projects reap debt-efficient type rewards 
(Ardila, Quiroga, and Vaughan, 1998).  Further, it is claimed that the more powerful member 
states advocate spending on projects where they (wealthier countries) are most likely to get 
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repaid.  Since this supposed reality serves as a causal mechanism for lending, state interests are 
linked to bank profiteering rather than acting as development agencies (Ben-Artzi, 2016).   
           In terms of the constructivist approach, not only have the IADB and ADB socially 
interacted with or made verbal commitments to improve the livelihood of indigenous groups, 
each bank has constructed individual units that allow for profound investigation and 
communication.  This means that both RDBs have opened up avenues for inspecting how 
different projects might harm indigenous habitats and listening to what these groups most 
immediate needs (whether this be education, health, etc.) may represent (Dalby, 1999).  
Additionally, the IADB and ADB have dedicated themselves to poverty reduction and social 
equity issues in what is dubbed as capital replenishment procedures.  Rather than simply 
avoiding project implementation that is detrimental to indigenous populations, the IADB has 
vouched to target expenditures (mostly agricultural and social) more proactively at indigenous 
demands (Deruyttere, 1997).  Due to their widespread upscaling of pressure, the ADB has placed 
certain projects on hold.  It claims that its intention is to investigate the sociocultural and 
economic consequences that these projects impose against villagers as a whole (Hirsch, 2001). 
 Another version of social interaction and, thus, identity formation exists through private 
capital markets.  Since member states only contribute a small paid-in share of total subscriptions, 
they are not able to exert as much leverage as these private (which provide the bulk of financing) 
entities.  RDBs, therefore, operate accordingly to banking interests.  The implementation of 
projects (mainly physical infrastructure) that are best apt at securing future funds serve as the 
backbone for RDB behavior (Humphrey, 2014).  With the emergence of a regime such as 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), however, private market incentives are not limited to pure 
capitalist gain.  Being impacted and influenced by civil society organizations (CSOs), CSR 
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behavior may also assume the form of protecting both people and their immediate environments 
from any private enterprise-led harm (Haslam, 2007).     
 The notion of ideational norms and self-identity might best explain why the AIIB has 
come to fruition.  Embedded and socialized by a neoliberal world order, China has adopted many 
norms (infrastructure investment, economic liberalization, sustainable development, etc.) of the 
Bretton Woods (BW) system (Johnston, 2008).  Being that the AIIB was created and is led by 
China, its purpose revolves around the latter country’s historical experience within IOs.  The 
existence of the AIIB, thus, can be perceived as a mere reflection of and complement to an IFI 
such as the World Bank (Hanlon, 2017).  Other research has pointed to the social engagements of 
member states after, rather than prior, the AIIB’s emergence.  Due to the AIIB having 50 non-
regional members (including many pro-environment EU countries), its identity has been 
influenced by these outside state actors.  It can be said, then, that the AIIB’s recent turn toward 
higher sustainability is a product of these social interaction processes (Chin, 2019).     
 Further constructivist research has turned to the internal dynamics of RDBs.  For 
instance, the adoption of an accountability mechanism (AM), public communication policy 
(PCP), and safeguard policy (SP) in the ADB signals an accommodated institutional form.  
Although not completely digressing from donor interests or the neoliberal world order, CSOs are 
considered to be partially responsible for these sudden changes (Uhlin, 2015).  In addition to 
these policy measures, the ADB has imposed an anti-corruption practice onto its agenda.  While 
many different factors (i.e. Western donor pressures, Asian economic crisis, organizational 
legitimacy concerns, etc.) might help to explain this more recent policy emergence, it is said that 
global norm diffusion acts as a reliable predictor.  The ADB, in other words, has made precedent 
30 
 
of transfusing World Bank and other IO standards (notably anti-corruption) into its own regional 
makeup (Komori, 2015). 
 
Conclusion 
 Due to the many different theoretically driven interpretations that are in place, it is quite 
easy to see why IR scholars vary in their opinions regarding international state behavior.  As a 
whole, realists view the global order as one that is dominated by hegemons.  International 
regimes and cooperation, thus, are a mere product of hegemonic willpower.  In fact, these 
particular scholars believe that middle power states join IOs in order to balance or play spoiler 
against and to (with the purpose of promoting their own agenda) the status quo.  Structural 
realists, on the other hand, point to the way in which hegemons are able to control IOs.  Looking 
at a RDB like the IADB, for instance, they claim that the U.S. can dictate decisions via its 
effective veto and relative voting power.  Despite other states having a stake in the pie, it is these 
structural imbalances that enable hegemonic dominance. 
 Liberals see international behavior as being guided by state preferences.  These 
preferences, hence, are typically motivated through domestic pressure groups.  From this angle, 
it can be said that international regimes and cooperation are determined by similar policy 
outcomes.  When state interests fall in line, in other words, cooperation takes place.  Liberal 
scholars argue that it is for this very reason that middle power states join IOs.  Such states seek to 
use the IOs in order to foster their aligned interests.  Not digressing too far from the liberal 
approach, the institutionalist perspective believes that middle power states coopt hegemonic 
ideas for the purpose of bettering their position or status within IOs.  Once they are able to 
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improve their status, they can then either conform to and benefit from the status quo or exert 
pressure for revisionary change.  In RDBs, and particularly the IADB, liberals claim that states 
are not bound by hegemonic willpower alone.  While the U.S. may indeed possess significant 
influence and voting power, it still requires the coalitional consent of other member states.  It can 
thus be assumed that these non-hegemonic states are converging their interests with the U.S. 
 In terms of the constructivist approach, international regimes and cooperation can be 
viewed from the standpoint of social interaction processes.  As states socially engage with one 
another, they begin to adopt each other’s policies.  This reality helps to explain why 
constructivist scholars believe that the world order is composed of many unique regimes that lay 
outside the sole realm of hegemonic influence.  Most of these scholars argue that the ability to 
enact soft power is the very reason that middle power states join IOs.  Being able to sway the 
U.S. into implementing their own policy desires provides middle power states an avenue to elicit 
potential continuity and change.  Since such endeavors are not incentivized by hegemons alone, 
it can be said that cooperation is the product of mutual state interests.  As for RDBs, with 
specific emphasis on the IADB, constructivist scholars point to the notion of CSOs and other 
influential groups.  These groups, in other words, are responsible for pressuring member states 
into adopting standards and procedures that conform to their goals.  It is in this manner that non-









 I begin this chapter by discussing the central theoretical (liberalism) framework that 
underlies the dissertation.  In the attempt to do so, it is useful to highlight some basic tenants of 
liberalism, revisit the main points of the literature discussed in Chapter 2, and discuss additional 
cited works.  These research groupings, collectively, provide the paper with both a rudimentary 
and substantive ground point.  Being that the liberal approach is a bit nuanced and somewhat 
underused, it seems necessary to elaborate on its meaning even further.  Once this more 
grandiose perspective has been better aligned with the core argument, I think it proper to expand 
upon the latter.  With this being said, I aim to demonstrate how liberalism holds much 
explanatory power in determining middle power (state) behavior at the regional and international 
level.  From this point forward, I intend to analytically critique competing paradigms while 
revealing the overall impact and implications that are connected to such an overarching 
theoretical (liberalism) phenomenon. 
 
A Liberal Theoretical Framework 
 Not digressing too much from other IR theories, neoliberal institutionalism makes a 
number of assumptions which are common to structural realism as well.  The first assumption is 
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premised on anarchy.  Neoliberals, hence, believe that the international environment lacks any 
authentic governmental authority.  Consequently, states are left to engage in self-help 
mechanisms and, therefore, fend for their own (Moravcsik, 2010).  The second assumption 
centers on rationality.  States (taking the shape of leader implemented decisions) act accordingly 
to their most sought-after interests.  If a mode of behavior is deemed beneficial, then states will 
cooperate.  The more costly interdependence becomes, however, states are likely to sequester 
themselves from such pragmatic entanglement (Milner, 1988).      
 According to the liberal school (and not completely distinct from other theories) of IR, 
the notion of cooperation is premised around state preferences.5  These state preferences, 
generally speaking, are a direct result of interest aggregation in domestic politics (Gourevitch, 
1978).  Since different factions exist within given societies, pluralism emerges as the norm.  This 
reality implies that similar or identical state preferences will likely produce a peaceful and 
cooperative international system.  A conflict of interests, therefore, is what induces imminent 
hostility and controversy amongst states (Moravcsik, 1997). 
 In terms of militarized conflict, liberals remain committed to the notion of similar versus 
dissimilar state preferences.  For instance, it makes no sense for the U.S. to initiate warfare 
against a country like Canada.  Nothing is to be gained (while power balancing is unnecessary) 
as this northern neighbor abides by Western behavioral norms (democracy, human rights, free 
market capitalism, etc.) (Gartzke, 1998).  This logic goes hand-in-hand with democratic peace 
                                                          
5 The version of liberalism that is being promoted throughout this dissertation relies heavily upon Andrew 
Moravcsik’s (1997) notion of state preferences.  Due to its more specific concepts and ideals, I find this type of 
liberalism to be a bit distinct from classical liberalism.  Although some parallels, however, do exist between 
Moravcsik’s definition of liberalism and classical liberalism, I also find that the latter can create confusion.  I do not 
intend for the work of Enlightenment philosophers such as John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, or Immanuel Kant 
to serve as the basis of my dissertation.  On a further note, this dissertation is neither premised on neoliberal 
institutionalist theory.  Some neoliberal institutionalist authors’ works are simply used to provide alternate 
theoretical perspective to the research argument.    
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theory.  Since domestic populaces within these regime types do not favor (as it infringes upon 
principles of state sovereignty and international trade) war in general, they expect a peaceful 
world order amongst each other (Doyle, 1986).  With autocratic governments presenting 
themselves as overly aggressive and often (whether it be fascism or Communism) countering 
democratic interests, this divergence may lead to hostile responses from democracies (Chan, 
1984).  Enacting interventionist responses versus North Korea and Vietnam over the Cold War 
era, therefore, was a mere product of ideological (Communism vs. capitalism) discrepancies.  
State preferences, essentially, were not par with one another.  Cooperation, thus, proceeds only 
when these interests are parallel (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999). 
 As mentioned previously, state preferences typically take on the form (including 
specialized groups) of their domestic populace (Rodrik, 1995).  Although these groups engage 
with domestic politics in certain aspects, they also possess a very transnational purpose.  They 
tend to consist of specialized professional experts in a given policy area.  Cooperation, therefore, 
is fostered at the international level when state preferences become similarly influenced by these 
epistemic entities (Haas, 1992).  Once again, power balancing politics are deemed as irrelevant 
and unnecessary under these conditions.  One notable example, in this sense, is the 
Mediterranean Plan.  A cohort of knowledgeable ecologists (epistemic community) asserted their 
environmental concerns (declining ecosystem, increased pollution, and minimization of the 
dolphin population) onto policymakers within the participant states.  These states, thus, 
responded by adopting the Plan with the intent to reduce such problems via mutual cooperative 
efforts.  The ideal of liberal cooperation here is not based on military conflict but environmental 
interests amongst a community of states (Haas, 1989). 
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 The same argument might be present when considering IOs.  Those states belonging to 
IOs also submit themselves to epistemic influence (Haas, 1992).  Ernst Haas uses an example 
referencing a Bretton Woods organization such as the IMF.  Regarding the IMF, expert liberal 
economists across the West advocated for certain policy changes after the abandonment of the 
gold standard in the early 1970s.  Two of the more significant changes were floating (rather than 
fixed) exchange rates and the disposal of capital controls.  As these so-called specialists began to 
attribute a lack of economic growth in direct relation to such previously held standards, Western 
states cooperated by altering their preferences to meet this more newfound specified policy 
criteria.  Such mutual engagement and change between states within this IO exemplifies how 
power balancing is not an incentive for cooperation.  Liberal state preferences, then, are not 
always premised on materialist competition (Haas, 1990). 
 Another form of non-conflictual liberal cooperation exists between democratic and 
autocratic governments.  In one account, it was noted how both forms of political regime types 
share the same preferences in certain issue areas (Held, 2010).  A good example of this reality 
might be located within the environmental and gender equality realms.  Although not always 
abided by in principle or practice, many of these states have participated in hallmark events like 
the 1992 Earth Summit and 1995 Conference on Women.  Despite such ideological 
(governmental regime type and human rights) differences that exist, democracies and 
autocracies, nonetheless, strive to reach ongoing modes of consensus and cooperation when they 
fulfill preferential outcomes (Held, 1998). 
 The liberal approach applies to my argument at hand primarily in terms of economics.  
As trade, investment, and economic integration increases within the Latin American and 
Caribbean region, member states have further incentive to expand upon their capital subscription 
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commitments in the IADB.  It is not difficult to envision the logic for state preferences here.  
With the steady pervasiveness of globalization, MNCs and other big businesses often receive the 
net benefits of enhanced socioeconomic development and economic engagement with the 
developing world.  Of course, it would be foolish to assume that all entrepreneurial entities 
absorb maximum rewards from such a systemic order.  In fact, many domestic enterprises are 
actually punished (loss of money or closure) by the repercussions of globalization.  This reality 
helps to explain why certain sectors (thanks to political lobbying) oftentimes gain protection 
(whether it be through tariffs, export subsidies, etc.) via their respected governments.  The 
bottom line, however, is that most post-industrial societies require external goods (primary and 
manufactured) to fulfill domestic demand.  The same principle remains in effect when looking at 
the positions of pre-industrial and secondary economies.  Since they depend on 
manufactured/service and agricultural/service output, international trade serves as a very useful 
purpose.  My argument, therefore, is based on the idea that capital elites tend to drive state 
preferences and, hence, are responsible for numerous decisions at the global level. 
 Aside from the economic aspect of liberalism, I do not deny that other factions exist. 
Pressure groups can come in many forms as they live to exert ample influence across their 
respected states.  For instance, an international non-governmental organization (INGO) such as 
Greenpeace is widely regarded as the most visible and active environmental group in the 
contemporary world.  The political leverage that it wields, indeed, has become noted as highly 
accountable for “green” decisions across both the domestic and global spectrums.  In fact, it is 
said that INGOs of this sort are why RDBs and IFIs have implemented environmental safeguard 
policies in their lending behavior.  Again, this phenomenon helps to illustrate that liberalism 
must not be reduced to a simple economic component.  I merely focus on an international 
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political economy (IPE) perspective due to the core argument of my dissertation.  Given the 
acknowledgment of these competing interest groups and the rationality-based structure of the 
theoretical approach, I believe this paper falls short of Marxist or critical theory categorization. 
 Although both middle and lesser powers constitute the units of analyses, one may wonder 
as to why the former type has been selected as the focal point of research.  The primary reason 
that I implement this approach is to challenge the conventional wisdom of realist thought.  In a 
globalized world that is still defined by many (particularly realists) as a cornerstone for power 
politics, it seems only necessary to dissect the truer intentions of those states that are able to 
challenge (or support) the existing hierarchy and rule of the international system.  Being that 
such supposed challengers are typically classified as middle or emerging powers, it makes sense 
to scrutinize them above all else.  Lesser power states, in other words, do not possess the material 
capabilities to pose any significant or direct threat to U.S. hegemony.  I have made it a point, 
nonetheless, to incorporate lesser powers into my analysis anyways.  My basis for this approach 
is simple.  If both middle and lesser powers demonstrate tendencies to increase RDB capital 
subscriptions (which provides an avenue to further trade) as their overall level of trade accrues in 
the given region, then it can be inferred that each member state is satisfactorily living (via mutual 
gains that are associated with liberal theory) under the umbrella of the Washington Consensus.  
Because capital subscriptions, thus, serve as a catalyst for fostering the net benefits of trade (state 
preferences), they are critical for upholding the liberal argument.  This brand of reasoning would 
also help explain why lesser powers continue to agree raising their aggregate number of 
subscriptions when they are often obliged to sacrifice voting rights via middle power-led 
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coalition blocs.6  When state preferences are coherently aligned, the desired outcomes matter 
more than any procedural technique. 
 What are the implications of middle power behavior?  Since my argument is based on the 
theoretical concept of liberalism and, therefore, that state preferences take shape around the 
current neoliberal world order, I believe that middle power states do not aim or wish to revise the 
status quo.  With this being said, these states are more than happy dwelling through the guidance 
of hegemonic stability.  Mutual, instead of relative, gains hold highest precedence amongst such 
potentially competing entities.  Middle powers are supportive of this arrangement, in part, 
because multinational firms from all economic sectors across various countries are most 
influential as they receive the net benefits of this contemporary global system.  I do not think 
they will be willing to risk the overall value of these monetary rewards for the sake of minute or 
redundant revisionary alterations.   
 Piggybacking on this assessment, I want to relate it to the current international questions 
that arise today.  Middle/emerging powers like China, Russia, India, Brazil, and so forth should 
not be viewed as imminent threats to Western neoliberalism or U.S. hegemony.  They merely 
seek to complement rather than overturn the status quo.  International associations and IOs like 
BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and AIIB, thus, ought to be welcomed with 
                                                          
6 Although the 48 member Board of Governors (one for each state) represent the highest body of authority in the 
IADB, they often delegate responsibilities to the 14 member Board of Executive Directors.  These directors, in turn, 
are elected by members located within their select voting blocs.  While the U.S. and Canada constitute their own 
IADB voting blocs, other members are compacted together.  Typically, these blocs (voting groups) are composed of 
non-regional with non-regional, and regional with regional, members.  When possible (as some blocs consist strictly 
of lesser power states), blocs tend to be led by middle power states.  Although lesser powers’ capital subscription 
shares and, therefore, weighted votes are still integral to the voting process, only the leader (dictator) of the bloc can 
actually cast votes (see Strand, 2003).  
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open arms.  These organizational bodies can fill both development and security 
(counterterrorism) voids that have become incessantly prevalent across the world. 
 
Limitations of Competing Theoretical Frameworks     
 The next step that I address here is why liberalism offers the best explanation for my 
argument.  I shall begin by recognizing that liberalism does not contain a universal element and, 
thus, other theories hold substantive power in their own right.  Looking at neoliberal 
institutionalism, it can be argued that member states in RDBs assent to increase capital 
subscriptions because they have garnered iterated information over the years.  These states, in 
other words, are able to develop steadfast expectations of one another’s behavior.  When actions 
fall parallel, transaction costs are lowered and regimes for lending may erupt.  The reason that I 
tend to question such a claim in this regard is due to the ambiguous nature of regimes.  For 
instance, the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) has yet to unleash its imminent and sought-after 
effects (lower trade barriers and further trade liberalization).  It is a direct result of clashing state 
preferences amongst developed and between developed and developing countries.  An even 
better example, perhaps, is the success and failure of the SCO.  While member states have 
achieved much cooperation in security measures, not so much has been witnessed toward 
establishing a free trade zone.  State preferences are very similar on one account but vastly 
different (mainly between China and Russia) on the other hand.  Regimes are only useful as long 
as they meet the preferential demands of states. 
 Using a constructivist framework, the argument can be made that many member states in 
RDBs behave accordingly to socially adopted norms.  As these states engage in a repeated 
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interactive setting, they are bound to hold some degree of influence over one another.  This 
reality might help to explain why the ADB has taken steps to impose accountability mechanisms, 
transparency initiatives, or environmental protectionist policies.  It is easy to see, however, that 
an abundance of these states will only abide by such practices so long as they do not hamper 
longer-term goals.  For instance, much to the chagrin of human rights and environmental 
activists, the ADB has pushed through with highly controversial projects (often leading to 
environmental degradation and involuntary resettlement) like Mae Moh (coal-fired power 
station) in Thailand and elsewhere.  The point here is that it seems a bit simplistic to assume that 
those states belonging to RDBs, IFIs, or IOs in general make decisions based on pure persuasive 
dialogue.  With this being said, I find it neither unlikely nor improbable that states will submit 
themselves to local pressure groups.  Identities and interests, thus, can emerge in this way.  I 
believe the result, then, is better explained by domestically-driven factors (liberalism) rather than 
an intersubjective meaning (constructivism) implanted from the outside. 
 The final theoretical perspective that I seek to evaluate is realism.  I believe the realist 
notion falls far short of offering any substantive explanatory power regarding RDB behavior.  In 
terms of balancing, member states have not attempted to align themselves against the U.S. 
hegemon.  A good reason for this stance, perhaps, centers on the idea that these states are content 
with the status quo.  Being that they receive ample benefits from the current neoliberal world 
order, member states have little, if any, incentive to change it.  Going even a step further, one 
would probably wonder as to what sense it makes to increase capital subscriptions when constant 
distortions of relative power may effect disequilibrium and, thus, create warfare.  Using another 
realist account, I do not think that the spoiler effect provides much insight either.  Yes, 
hypothetically speaking, it can be said that many of these states are eventually going to use their 
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relative gains in order to exact some form of revision.  Again, this strategy appears to be very 
foolish when it would merely serve to disrupt what is a seemingly benevolent systemic order.  
The potential sacrifice, in other words, could be monumental in exchange for something 
minimal.  Rather than focusing on power politics alone, realists might fare better if they were to 
consider an actual balance of threat mechanism.  As long as member states in Western-led IOs 
play by the rules of the game (neoliberalism), they have no reason to fear and, therefore, balance 






Data and Methodology 
 
Introduction  
 In this study, I examine one particular RDB, the IADB.  The reasons that I have selected 
the IADB for analysis are fairly straightforward.  It consists of both regional (e.g. Argentina and 
Brazil) and non-regional (e.g. the U.S. and Germany) member countries.  While the former type 
serve as both donor and recipient, its non-regional counterpart acts solely as a donor.  Another 
trait of the IADB is that it relies on a weighted voting system in order to make decisions.  Since 
the regional member countries occupy a majority shareholder stake (50.02%) within the bank, 
coalitions are required for enactment.  This reality means that hegemonic powers alone cannot 
determine RDB outcomes.  The U.S., for instance, must be able to acquire the weighted votes of 
other non-regional (most notably European) member countries if it seeks to perform an ordinary 
veto decision. 
  Although non-regional member countries exist in the IADB, their shareholder stakes are    
different.  The U.S., for example, owns roughly 30% of weighted voting in the bank, yet, the 
next highest, Japan, only witnesses about 5%.  While the superpower is the largest shareholder in 
the bank, it still requires the approval of other non-regional members if decisions are to be made 
in its favor.  The implication behind such claims are rather simplistic.  Despite the U.S. 
possessing a relatively higher stake and, therefore, needing fewer coalitions in the IADB, its 
interests are nonetheless dependent on vast support across fellow non-regional countries.     
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 The origin and history of the bank are a bit distinguished as well.  Initially proposed in 
1890 at the first Pan-American Conference, the IADB was intended to serve as an inter-
American organization that would foster multilateral cooperation amongst regional members.  
The purpose, in other words, centered on the establishment of a customs union, legal measures to 
settle territorial disputes, and so forth.  Eventually founded in 1959 against the backdrop of 
Communism, this RDB hosted many non-regional members for the purpose of geopolitical and 
strategic alliance.  These external states were essentially brought in to act as bulwarks against 
any possible leftist-driven decisions. 
 On a final note, I find it useful to explore the difference in non-regional members.  Most   
non-regional members are from North America and Europe.  In fact, only four (China, Israel, 
Japan, and South Korea) states are from outside of the Western region.  No countries from Africa 
are current members.  The IADB, especially when compared to other RDBs (i.e. AfDB), has 
seen little influx of non-regional members (22 versus 26) over a longer course of time.  These 
realities beg for questions and answers as to why such happenings are taking place.  If the non-
regional member position within the IADB is not very well-pronounced, then I believe it makes 
much sense to explore why this actuality (status quo) tends to be the norm.                
 The selected time-series for this study is 2004-2018.  Although spanning only 15 years, I 
have chosen this time period because of limited data availability.  The IADB, for instance, does 
not allow direct access to its annual reports prior to the year 2000.  Additionally, there are a 
couple of missing years (1996 and 1999) from its working website.  Despite such lack of data, I 
believe that this time-series, nonetheless, is highly beneficial.  My reason for saying so is in 
direct connection to the substantial changes that have occurred within this RDB over the given 
time.  From 2004-2018, Canada and Japan (two of the IADB’s non-regional shareholders)--often 
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considered to be middle powers--have seen their total subscriptions multiply by nearly double.  
In 2004, the number was at just over $4 and $5 million, respectively.  Today, those numbers are 
approximately $7 and $9 million.  As one of the IADB’s largest regional shareholders, Brazil, 
which is also classified as a middle power, had total subscriptions of right below $11 million in 
2004.  In 2018, this figure fell barely underneath $20 million.  Due to the consistency of such 
changes over an extended period, I find it both pertinent and very useful to implement a study 
bound within a mere 15 year time frame. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable is the change in IADB capital subscriptions for each donor and 
year.  The data are in log form to normalize the measure.  I employ the first-difference in the log 
of subscription shares, which yields the percentage change.  In order to properly assess the IADB 
data, I collected the information from the IADB website (https://www.iadb.org/en/about-
us/annual-reports).  While the IADB contains ample information (annual reports spanning over 
decades), it only grants public access to its records from 2000-2018.  Regardless of such a 
limitation, I still believe that the IADB provides a proper amount of necessary information for 
coding.  Using 15 years of annual data, in other words, is believed to be sufficient for the 
purpose of this work.  Because the dependent variable is continuous, the equations will be 
estimated for a cross-sectional time-series model.  Diagnostics suggested that the pooled 
estimator is more appropriate than random or fixed effects.  The models include corrections to 
the standard errors (panel correction) for heteroscedasticity (see Beck and Katz, 1995).  
However, the pooled autocorrelation parameter (rho) for the first-differenced-models was 
relatively small, and as such, no corrections are implemented. 
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 In order to better understand how capital subscriptions are defined throughout this 
dissertation, and the processes by which they operate, I provide a detailed account here.  
Although capital subscriptions can be understood in various ways (i.e. as symbols of weighted 
voting power), they are also a critical foreign aid tool.  Capital subscription shares provide the 
resources for the bank’s concessional finance and multilateral assistance programs (IADB, 
2020).  However, it should be noted that the enactment of capital subscription replenishments in 
the IADB does not occur on a regular or annual basis.  Member states only convene every so 
often to determine if they want continuity or change in their subscription shares.  In fact, the 
General Capital Increase (GCI) cycles can last for as briefly as a few years (e.g. 1990-1993, 
GCI-7; 2011-2015, GCI-9) years, or many years (e.g. 1994-2010, GCI-8).  After the members 
have agreed to the capital increase, “…parliaments in each of its member countries seek 
legislative approvals to subscribe and contribute as well as the budgetary appropriation of the 
necessary funds” (IADB, 2020).   
 Certain provisions exist, however, that allow member states to alter their designated 
amount (whether these be paid-in or callable contributions) within a given GCI cycle, and this 
may include annual changes to subscription shares.  This claim is supported by evidence noted in 
the IADB “GCI-9” report (2010: 39-91).  Since this option has become readily available, many 
members have acted upon their opportunities to increase (and/or decrease) individual funding.  
Such instances are revealed throughout the list of annual IADB reports, (see, e.g., IADB website 
https://www.iadb.org/en/about-us/annual-reports).  To catch a glimpse of the comparisons 
between members, the data in Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate moments of clear change within the 
GCI-9 cycle.  As might be expected, though, not all states change their shares on an annual basis.  
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Because there is no obligation to shift subscription amounts, even if other members do so, some 
totals remain stationery. 
 To summarize, then, there is evidence of some annual change in subscription shares 
during the time-series for my study, and there was at least one major change during the period in 
question.  Perhaps more important, my estimation method – which is a pooled population 
estimator – will yield the effects of the covariates on the average first-differenced change in 
subscription shares across all donors (including middle powers) and years.  In other words, the 
models capture the average effect of the key independent variables on the change in subscription 
shares – from GCI events and annual variation – among all members, including middle powers.  
Thus, modeling capital subscription shares as the dependent variable is reasonable for the 



























Argentina 538.2 13331.1 13869.3 532.2 
Austria 7.9 192.7 200.6 21.0 
Bahamas 13.0 255.5 268.5 11.2 
Barbados 6.5 159.8 166.3 1.9 
Belgium 16.2 396.9 413.1 44.6 
Belize 7.9 133.9 141.8 8.0 
Bolivia 43.2 1070.5 1113.7 51.1 
Brazil 538.2 13331.1 13869.3 573.2 
Canada 197.9 7906.1 8104.0 328.9 
Chile 147.8 3660.7 3808.5 166.1 
China 0.1 3.1 3.2 131.1 
Colombia 147.8 3660.7 3808.5 161.2 
Costa Rica 21.6 535.4 557.0 24.5 
Croatia 2.4 58.4 60.8 6.2 
Denmark 8.4 205.0 213.4 21.0 
Dominican 
Republic 
28.8 714.6 743.4 35.7 
Ecuador 28.8 714.6 743.4 31.9 
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El Salvador 21.6 535.4 557.0 22.5 
Finland 7.9 192.7 200.6 19.9 
France 93.7 2292.9 2386.6 232.8 
Germany 93.7 2292.9 2386.6 241.3 
Guatemala 28.8 714.6 743.4 34.4 
Guyana 8.9 197.9 206.8 8.7 
Haiti 21.6 535.4 557.0 22.9 
Honduras 21.6 535.4 557.0 27.8 
Israel 7.8 190.0 197.8 18.0 
Italy 93.7 2292.9 2386.6 227.2 
Jamaica 28.8 714.6 743.4 30.2 
Japan 247.4 6050.2 6297.6 623.3 
Mexico 346.0 8569.5 8915.5 346.4 
Netherlands 14.6 325.6 340.3 36.9 
Nicaragua 21.6 535.4 557.0 25.4 
Norway 8.4 205.0 213.4 21.0 
Panama 21.6 535.4 557.0 26.7 
Paraguay 21.6 535.4 557.0 29.3 
Peru 72.0 1784.2 1856.2 84.0 
Portugal 2.6 65.1 67.7 8.2 
Slovenia 1.5 35.5 37.0 3.6 
South Korea 0.1 3.1 3.2 1.0 
Spain 93.7 2292.9 2386.6 226.4 
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Suriname 6.3 107.2 113.5 6.6 
Sweden 16.1 394.5 410.6 42.2 
Switzerland 23.3 569.0 592.3 67.1 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
21.6 535.4 557.0 22.0 
United Kingdom 47.6 1164.5 1212.1 183.9 
United States 1484.9 36309.5 37794.4 5076.4 
Uruguay 57.7 1429.6 1487.3 58.7 
Venezuela 249.3 5568.5 5817.8 315.3 
Total Amount 4941.1 123840.0 128781.1 10239.7 
 
Note:  Data are calculated by millions of U.S. dollars, and are rounded; detail may not add to 
grand total because of rounding.  Non-voting temporary callable shares with a par value of 
$3,066 million are actually present in this year.  FSO contributions are no longer separate; 


























Argentina 589.8 15403.0 15992.8 532.2 
Austria 8.5 219.5 228.0 21.0 
Bahamas 13.7 284.2 297.9 11.2 
Barbados 7.1 184.5 191.6 1.9 
Belgium 17.6 451.7 469.3 44.6 
Belize 8.5 155.3 163.8 8.0 
Bolivia 47.3 1237.1 1284.4 51.1 
Brazil 538.2 13331.1 13869.3 573.2 
Canada 214.5 6896.1 7110.6 329.7 
Chile 162.0 4229.8 4391.8 166.1 
China 0.1 3.8 3.9 131.1 
Colombia 162.0 4229.8 4391.8 161.2 
Costa Rica 23.7 618.8 642.5 24.5 
Croatia 2.6 66.7 69.3 6.2 
Denmark 9.1 233.4 242.5 21.0 
Dominican 
Republic 
31.6 825.8 857.4 35.7 
Ecuador 31.6 824.2 855.8 31.9 
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El Salvador 23.6 617.6 641.2 22.5 
Finland 8.5 219.5 228.0 19.9 
France 101.6 2608.5 2710.1 232.8 
Germany 101.6 2608.5 2710.1 241.3 
Guatemala 30.8 793.4 824.2 34.4 
Guyana 9.5 220.0 229.5 8.7 
Haiti 23.6 617.6 641.2 22.9 
Honduras 23.7 618.8 642.5 27.8 
Israel 8.4 216.4 224.8 18.0 
Italy 101.6 2608.5 2710.1 227.2 
Jamaica 30.8 793.4 824.2 30.2 
Japan 268.1 6882.5 7150.6 623.3 
Mexico 379.1 9901.6 10280.7 346.4 
Netherlands 14.6 325.6 340.2 36.9 
Nicaragua 23.6 617.6 641.2 25.4 
Norway 9.1 233.4 242.5 21.0 
Panama 23.6 617.6 641.2 26.7 
Paraguay 23.6 617.6 641.2 29.3 
Peru 78.9 2061.6 2140.5 84.0 
Portugal 2.9 74.2 77.1 8.2 
Slovenia 1.6 40.7 42.3 3.6 
South Korea 0.1 3.8 3.9 1.0 
Spain 103.3 2677.6 2780.9 226.4 
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Suriname 6.6 119.4 126.0 6.6 
Sweden 17.5 448.9 466.4 42.2 
Switzerland 25.2 647.5 672.7 67.3 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
23.1 594.5 617.6 22.0 
United Kingdom 51.6 1324.8 1376.4 183.9 
United States 1609.1 41303.1 42912.2 5076.4 
Uruguay 63.2 1652.0 1715.2 58.7 
Venezuela 249.3 5568.5 5817.8 315.3 
Total Amount 5357.0 138901.0 144258.0 10240.0 
 
Note:  Data are calculated by millions of U.S. dollars, and are rounded; detail may not add to 
grand total because of rounding.  Non-voting temporary callable shares with a par value of 
$1,390 million are actually present in this year.  All states, except Canada, the Netherlands, and 
Venezuela, see a net increase in their ordinary capital stock; Canada actually witnesses a net 
decrease.  Total FSO contributions show a slight increase; few states increased their total 








Independent Variable and Controls  
 The main independent variable is bilateral trade between IADB members and the Latin 
American and Caribbean region.  I include this economic indicator because it is directly linked to 
prior research about state preferences associated with liberal theory.  With that being said, the 
trade covariate serves as a proxy for the alignment of middle power and U.S. state preferences.  
The measures for trade are in constant 2010 dollars and log-transformed.  For middle power, I 
employ the interaction term of middle power’s trade (log, in constant 2010 million of dollars) 
with the Latin American region.  I expect that higher trade between the middle power and the 
region will, on average, increase the probability of an increase of the middle power’s capital 
share in the IADB.  For bilateral trade, the data is retrieved from the IMF Direction of Trade 
Statistics, the Correlates of War (COW) https://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/bilateral-
trade, and the WTO https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/trade_datasets_e.htm.   
 I also include several controls in the model.  The first control is the degree of voting 
affinity between the middle power and the U.S. in the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA).  This measure is a proxy for U.S. hegemonic influence toward middle power states.  
The measure is taken from Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2015).  A lack of hegemonic success 
to sway middle power states in the UNGA, or a divergence between UNGA vote-buying and 
middle power versus U.S. capital subscription shares (increase versus decrease in capital 
subscription shares or vice-versa), falls more in line with the precepts of liberal theory.  On the 
other hand, if there is a strong association between UNGA voting affinity scores and decisions 
on capital subscriptions, then it can be assumed that IADB member states might be operating 




 In terms of the political orientation of incumbent governments, this control is directly 
linked to a society-centered framework.  Prior literature suggests that domestic politics often 
imposes a heavy impact on donor aid policies (Irwin, 2000; Lancaster, 2008; Milner and Tingley, 
2010).  Subnational level influences, in other words, are primarily responsible for the allocation 
and increase or decrease of foreign aid.  More particular, ample research reveals that a change in 
the ruling political party is what ultimately determines aid volatility (Bulir and Lane, 2002; Eifert 
and Gelb, 2005).  Hence, leftist governments are more likely than their right-wing counterparts 
to distribute vast amounts of official development assistance (ODA).  Some studies, in fact, 
demonstrate that such domestic political variables (partisan ideology) actually affect aid 
disbursement between donors and multilateral recipients (Tingley, 2010).  It is for this reason 
that the left-wing incumbent governments of middle power states might be suspected to increase 
capital subscriptions while their rightist adversaries do the opposite.  For the purpose of coding, I 
resort to an ordinal scale of “1” for left and “2” for center, and “3” for right.  The data is 
retrieved from a global database compiled by researchers at the World Bank Development 
Research Group.  Known as the Database of Political Institutions 2017, it can be located at the 
following website, https://publications.iadb.org/en/database-political-institutions-2017-dpi2017. 
 The middle power dummy variable is used in order to distinguish the effect that middle 
power states and lesser power states have on total subscription shares.  Not that there is an 
expected (as both middle and smaller powers benefit from mutual gains) difference among these 
states, but due to diverging (as discussed in Chapter 5) strategies such as aid-follows-trade 
(which predicts more foreign assistance for middle powers) and trade-not-aid (which predicts 
less foreign assistance for middle powers), it seems only necessary to institute this control.  In 
terms of coding, I implement a binary approach.  The number “0” represents not a middle, or 
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therefore lesser, power, while “1” represents middle power.  To arrive at a sufficient definition of 
middle powers, I draw on the previously aforementioned literature on middle powers (see 
Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 1993; Holbraad, 1984; Cox and Sinclair, 1996), and operationalize 
the concept in a way that combines elements from realist, liberal, and ideational approaches.  
Middle powers, in this sense, are classified by their median position in the world economy, state 
(potential military) capacity, and willpower to engage in prominent international associations or 
IOs.  For the latter aspect, I look at which of the IADB member states are also members of 
highly recognized global entities, including the G20, UNSC, BRICS, and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).7  Because they have chosen to be members of 
these most notable international bodies, I operationalize under the assumption that such states are 
trying to instrumentally assert (via prominent decision-making roles) themselves within the 
world order. 
 The regional borrower dummy variable is used to assess the impact that being a regional 
borrowing member or not has on total capital subscriptions.  Again, not that a probabilistic 
difference is anticipated here, but due to hypothesized (as discussed in Chapter 5) reasons that 
could potentially benefit (i.e. higher amounts of directly utilized multilateral aid) regional 
members versus those which further assist (i.e. financial liberalization or foreign direct 
investment (FDI) opportunities) non-regional members, it appears proper to include this control.  
The coding, once again, is performed using a binary scale.  The number “0” typifies not a 
                                                          
7 As noted above and earlier in the dissertation, this particular classification of middle powers is an amalgamation of 
the definitions listed in Chapter 1.  Of specific emphasis, however, is the willpower to engage in prominent 
international associations and IOs.  If a state does not meet this criteria, then it is not considered to be a middle 
power.  Median position in the world economy and state capacity, therefore, only matter so much as countries 
demonstrate a tendency to actually assert themselves through well-known international bodies.  Although the 
categorization put forth is not wholly unique, it is my own.  Other types and subtypes (as will be seen in Chapter 5), 
though, do exist and might be used to challenge or alter the meaning (at least in this context) of middle powers.     
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regional borrowing member while “1” typifies a regional borrowing member.  Not surprisingly, 
the method of implementation is rather straightforward.  Those countries which are able to 
receive funds from the IADB meet the latter criteria, as states which cannot fall into the former 
category.              
 
Methodology 
 The research approach that is taken in this dissertation consists of quantitative 
methodology.  I use a cross-sectional time-series analysis to demonstrate whether an increase of 
bilateral trade causes middle state donors to subscribe for more capital in RDBs.  The non-
regional donor countries that have been selected for examination include Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, China, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom.8  Since most (i.e. notable exception being Croatia) of these countries have 
qualified (either partially or wholly throughout the examined time-series) as middle or emerging 
powers, in accordance to common descriptive standards, and are also members of the IADB, it 
seems fitting to integrate them into this type of methodological study.9  On an additional note, I 
                                                          
8 These are the years in which each of the selected non-regional members became middle powers as relevant to my 
given time-series estimates:  Austria (2004), Belgium (2004), Canada (2004), China (2004), Denmark (2004), 
Finland (2004), France (2004), Germany (2004), Israel (2010), Italy (2004), Japan (2004), the Netherlands (2004), 
Norway (2004), Portugal (2004), Slovenia (2010), South Korea (2004), Spain (2004), Sweden (2004), Switzerland 
(2004), United Kingdom (2004).  As noted above, Croatia does not meet the criteria for middle power status. As 
noted above, however, Chapter 5 presents an alternative trial (in a footnote) that shows the results are robust to an 
alternative coding system which yields fewer middle powers.  
9 On a further note, I think it is worth mentioning why some non-regional states (e.g. South Korea (2005) and China 
(2009)) choose to join RDBs such as the IADB and, thus, why others (i.e. South Africa or Turkey) do not.  My 
central suspicion is that those who enter have increasing economic stakes (whether this be through FDI or trade) at 
hand, while those who stay out are either limited in their financial transactions within the given region or fiscally 
disengaged altogether.  Of course, for countries like Russia, not entering the IADB is probably more of a 
geopolitical choice, as it tries to promote its own (attempted) hegemonic influence in the region.      
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want to point out that the U.S. (largest non-regional donor) is excluded from the data.  Being that 
it operates as the world hegemon, there is little doubt that its primary aims revolve around 
maintaining a position of both structural and relative power within the international order.  While 
the U.S. does not publish its voting records in the IADB, it, nonetheless, can be assumed that the 
superpower will act against any decision that jeopardizes or threatens its relative power and, 
therefore, status of hegemon.       
 Also, I have decided to include all regional members as well.  Whether they are regional 
borrowing middle powers such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, or lesser power states 
like the remainder of the regional members, it seems necessary to assess the overall impact that 
trade has on capital subscriptions.10  By implementing this approach, additional cases are 
incorporated into the study, thus, allowing for more substantive generalizations.  In order to 
control for the effect of middle powers alone, I interact them with bilateral trade.  This way the 
results are specifically focused on middle power states.  Due to such a vast amount of cases, the 
quantitative approach appears best fit to produce the most generalizable results. 
  
                                                          
10 These are the years in which each of the selected regional members became middle powers as relevant to my 
given time-series estimates:  Argentina (2009), Brazil (2009), Chile (2010), and Mexico (2004).  As noted above, 





Results and Analysis 
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I present the results of the statistical regression models.  I decided to 
estimate four linear regression models.  The first regression model is a baseline model.  It 
presents the dependent variable as a first difference in the log of capital subscription shares, and 
estimates the effect of the main covariates of interest.  However, the dependent variable is run as 
a first difference in the log of capital subscription shares.  This technique helps to measure the 
percentage change in the log of capital subscriptions for each country and year on average.  The 
second regression model is similar to the baseline model, but with particular emphasis on the 
interaction term between middle powers and trade with Latin America and the Caribbean.  In 
other words, the second model specifies the effect of middle powers’ trade with Latin America 
and the Caribbean region on capital subscription shares.  To show the robustness of the results, 
the third regression model is estimated with a different measure of the dependent variable, the    
log of total subscription shares.  The fourth regression model includes an interactive term    
between middle powers and trade and, thus, represents the sole difference with model three.   
 After presenting the results for each model, I offer a brief interpretation.  Once this setup 
is in place and completed, I turn to a broader discussion.  This section is primarily used to 
provide support for a liberal interpretation of the models.  Also, this section highlights alternate 
ways in which liberalism can be viewed, and the various forms it can take in shaping middle 
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powers’ behavior in regional development banks.  With this introduction now in order, I proceed 
to the models themselves. 
 
Results 
 Table 1 presents the baseline model (Model 1).  As one can see, the main independent 
variable is consistent with expectations of trade on all donor behavior.  The coefficient for the 
log of trade is both positive and significant.  This finding suggests that the percentage change in 
the log of IADB members’ subscription shares increase as their trade with Latin America and the 
Caribbean goes up.  However, it is important to note that the trade variable in Model 1 applies to 
all donors.  We will need to examine the interaction term for middle powers and trade to 
understand if the effect holds for that subgroup.  I shall touch upon this point in a later section. 
 As for the control variables in Model 1, they all achieve statistical significance with the 
exception of the regional borrower dummy variable.  However, the signs for some coefficients in 
Model 1 run opposite to expectations.  The coefficient for the political orientation covariate, 
surprisingly, is significant and positive.  It is important to recall that for this variable higher 
values are associated with more conservative partisan control of government.  The model 
suggests, then, that left-wing governments are actually less inclined to increase multilateral 
assistance, as measured by the percentage change in the log of subscription shares.  Not only 
does this result run contrary to my expectation, but it also defies the conventional wisdom of 
many foreign aid scholars.    
  





Determinants of Change in IADB Subscription Shares (Model 1, Baseline) 
 
Covariate Coefficient Panel-Corrected 
Standard Error 
P-Value 
Trade (log) 0.0561582 0.0254739 0.027 
Political Orientation 0.0237541 0.0114592 0.038 
Voting Affinity 0.2386509 0.1256302 0.057 
Middle Power -0.1215967 0.0652351 0.062 
Regional Borrower -0.0508746 0.0390038 0.192 
Constant -0.5555111 0.1971557 0.005 
Number Observations 652   
R-Square 0.1039   
Wald Chi-Square 22.50  0.0004 
 










 The coefficient for voting affinity shows an unanticipated result.  I expected an 
insignificant relationship between members’ voting affinity with the U.S. in the UN General 
Assembly and their IADB subscription shares.  However, the coefficient is positive and 
significant, suggesting that there is indeed a strong positive relationship between UNGA voting 
and the change in log of subscription shares.  This finding suggests that IADB member 
countries’ decisions may be swayed by U.S. influence with the bank.  If these states do respond 
to such hegemonic pressure, then perhaps there is room for neorealist interpretation.     
 The results for the middle power dummy variable in Model 1 also run counter to my 
expectation.  Given the negative coefficient, the percentage change in the log of subscription 
shares in the IADB is negative, on average, and all things being equal.  Once again, however, the 
results of Model 2 offer additional and differing perspective on this matter.  The effect, therefore, 
appears sketchy at best. 
 Next, I discuss the results for Model 2, in Table 2.  Along with Model 1, the main 
independent (trade) variable in Table 2 is statistically significant and in the positive direction.  
While this relationship is on par with expectation, the interaction variable between trade and 
middle powers displays a much different outcome.  As mentioned above, this specific interaction 
term reveals that there is actually a statistically significant and negative relationship for middle 
powers.  The coefficient for the interaction term shows that among middle powers, every unit 
increase in middle powers’ trade with Latin America and the Caribbean is associated with a 
decrease in the percentage change of their subscription shares.  This reality suggests that the 






Determinants of Change in IADB Subscription Shares with Interaction Term (Model 2) 
 
Covariate Coefficient Panel-Corrected 
Standard Error 
P-Value 
Trade (log) 0.0836937 0.0348864 0.016 
Political Orientation 0.0349608 0.0120359 0.004 
Voting Affinity 0.200928 0.1252618 0.109 
Middle Power 0.6202892 0.2362318 0.009 
Regional Borrower -0.0393449 0.0364358 0.280 
Trade and Middle 
Power Interaction 
Term 
-0.0802723 0.0323784 0.013 
Constant -0.7985137 0.2712238 0.003 
Number Observations 652   
R-Square 0.1417   
Wald Chi-Square 45.56  0.0000 
 









 The control variables in Model 2 are similar to the results discussed previously.  The 
coefficient for political orientation is both statistically significant and in the positive direction.  
Once again, this result suggests that more conservative governments are associated with a 
percentage increase in subscription shares.  If state preferences (i.e. trade) are responsible for 
motivating members’ behavior, then one would think of political orientation as irrelevant.  
Additionally, and as stated above, the result is inconsistent with the literature that hypothesizes 
that left-wing governments are more likely to disburse multilateral aid.   
 Although the coefficient for voting affinity remains positive in Model 2, it is not 
statistically significant.  This result is much more on line with the anticipated outcome.  The 
critical narrative here, thus, is that IADB member states are not necessarily giving into U.S. 
pressure.  This argument goes more in hand with a liberal theoretical approach rather than 
structural realism.  However, given that the results for voting affinity are not consistent across 
models, it is difficult to draw any broad conclusions for this variable.  
 While the coefficient for the regional borrower dummy remains statistically insignificant 
in Model 2, the middle power dummy variable is statistically significant but in the positive 
direction.  This result differs from the one in Model 1 in that middle powers are associated with a 
higher percentage change in their subscription, but not when their trade with the region is 
growing.  As mentioned above, this relationship runs counter from what is anticipated.  Being 
that the coefficients are negative in Model 1 and positive in Model 2, it can be inferred that this 
dummy variable is inconsistent. 
 To examine whether the results are robust to alternative specifications, I also present two 
models where the dependent variable is the log of subscription shares (Models 3-4, in Tables 3-
4).  Consistent with Models 1 and 2, the coefficients for the log of trade in Models 3 and 4 are 
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both positive and statistically significant.  This result falls directly in line with one of the 
arguments in this dissertation.  As IADB member states experience an increase in trade in the 
Latin America and Caribbean region, they raise their total amount of capital subscriptions.  
However, as with Model 2, there is a very different effect between middle powers and trade in 
Model 4.  As a result, the finding does not hold among middle powers.11 
 The findings for the control variables in Models 3 and 4 are fairly straightforward.  The 
coefficients for political orientation, while remaining in the positive direction, are statistically 
insignificant in Models 3 and 4 (Tables 3 and 4).  These results are much different from the ones 
of Models 1 and 2.  With this being said, the models demonstrate that my expectation of leftist, 
centrist, and rightist governments having the same probability of equal influence on total 
subscription shares may indeed be accurate.  Further, the fact that the relationship continues to be 
positive – but insignificant – does not support the prior literature.  The claim that left-wing 
governments are more likely to give foreign aid, in other words, still looks very weak. 
 Along with Model 1, the coefficients for voting affinity are positive and statistically 
significant in Models 3 and 4.  This result, once again, supports the notion that U.S. influence is 
extremely consequential in motivating IADB member states’ decisions, or, at least when trade 
                                                          
11 For the purpose of obtaining further results, I decided to estimate an alternative model based on an alternative 
coding of middle powers.  In this trial, I looked at the top 10 countries (throughout the time-series) in the world as 
measured by total geographical area, military expenditures, and GDP.  I excluded the U.S., and then coded the other 
top nine.  To be included, the country had to be in the top 10 in at least two of three categories.  The alternative 
coding yields these middle powers:  Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and the 
United Kingdom.  It is loosely based on Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel’s (1970) conceptualization.  Using this 
alternative coding, the results are fairly consistent with the prior models.  The coefficient for the log of trade remains 
positive and statistically significant (p<.001).  Also, the coefficient for the interaction term between trade and middle 
powers is negative (again, yielding an unanticipated effect) and statistically significant (p<.001).  Finally, similar to 
Model 1, yet different from the other three models, the coefficient for middle powers is negative (meaning that 
middle powers actually see a lower growth in subscription shares compared to lesser power states) and statistically 
significant (p<.001).  The results were completely consistent with another trial where I included the top 20 countries 
as middle powers, as measured by total geographical area, military expenditures, and GDP. 
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amongst middle powers is not taken into its full consideration.  Of course, this realist-based 
claim runs contrary to my expectation of more autonomous state behavior located within the 
























Determinants of IADB Subscription Shares (Model 3, Baseline) 
 
Covariate Coefficient Panel-Corrected 
Standard Error 
P-Value 
Trade (log) 0.6197497 0.019634 0.000 
Political Orientation 0.0177665 0.0278695 0.524 
Voting Affinity 1.629769 0.4960839 0.001 
Middle Power 0.6169373 0.0893699 0.000 
Regional Borrower 2.133811 0.1509652 0.000 
Constant -1.051839 0.2311878 0.000 
Number Observations 699   
R-Square 0.5181   
Wald Chi-Square 6274.38  0.0000 
 












Determinants of IADB Subscription Shares with Interaction Term (Model 4) 
 
Covariate Coefficient Panel-Corrected 
Standard Error 
P-Value 
Trade (log) 0.639321 0.024523 0.000 
Political Orientation 0.0248818 0.030588 0.416 
Voting Affinity 1.605489 0.4946074 0.001 
Middle Power 1.149433 0.245078 0.000 
Regional Borrower 2.141063 0.1490143 0.000 
Trade and Middle 
Power Interaction 
Term 
-0.0577692 0.0312587 0.065 
Constant -1.222853 0.2230037 0.000 
Number Observations 699   
R-Square 0.5186   
Wald Chi-Square 7889.65  0.0000 
 









 The middle power and regional borrower dummy coefficients are both statistically 
significant and in the positive direction in Models 3 and 4.  As stated previously, I do not 
anticipate being a middle power or developing country as having any overbearing impact on the 
total amount of capital subscription shares.  Rather, an increase or decrease in trade among 
middle powers and the region should be associated with the total amount that each middle power 
state contributes to the IADB.  Either way, while the former result (middle power membership) 
is congruent with that of Model 2, the latter result (regional borrower status) has yet to show any 
sign of statistical significance.   
 It does make sense as to why this occurrence might actually be possible.  If those 
members which are able (versus those that cannot) to receive funds witness an increase in trade 
in the Latin America and Caribbean region, then they may be more likely to raise their amount of 
capital subscriptions.  However, since I believe that all member states are receiving net benefits 
from such disbursements, it is surprising to see statistical significance here.  Given the results of 
Models 1 and 2, though, I think this outcome is highly questionable.               
 I use a question to expand upon this argument a bit further.  What might explain the 
positive and statistically significant relationship between regional borrowers and capital 
subscriptions in these trials?  Because borrowers are being directly funded by the IADB, it only 
makes sense to increase the amount of benefits they can potentially receive.  However, as also 
stated above, this result runs counter to my expectation.  If non-regional borrowing members are 
equally gaining (via trade) from their capital subscription shares, then it appears that they too 






 As demonstrated in all four models, the coefficients for trade are on par with 
expectations.  Each coefficient is statistically significant and in the positive direction.  This 
finding helps to support the liberal argument that IADB member states make decisions (i.e. 
raising or lowering subscription shares) in response to their own enlightened self-interest (mutual 
gains) rather than being mandated through U.S. hegemony.  However, when the interaction 
between middle powers and trade is considered, the coefficient becomes negative.  This 
occurrence suggests that the liberal argument might need to be modified.  Otherwise, why would 
capital subscription shares decrease as trade in Latin America and the Caribbean goes up?  I seek 
to provide further answers to this dilemma. 
 Staying within the context of foreign aid, one reasonable explanation as to why middle 
powers may decrease their IADB capital subscriptions when trade goes up is that Latin America 
and Caribbean countries are receiving additional funding from alternate lending sources.  For 
instance, perhaps these states have been relying more on IFIs such as the World Bank and IMF.  
Alternatively, Latin American states may continue to absorb sufficient funds from other RDBs 
and sub-regional development banks (SRDBs) such as the Development Bank of Latin America 
(CAF), the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), the Caribbean 
Development Bank (CDB), FONPLATA Development Bank, and so forth.  It could be that such 
Latin America and Caribbean states have become more inclined to private based (banks and 
credit agencies) lending institutions.  Even further, maybe many of these middle power countries 
have increased the level of their bilateral assistance and, therefore, do not need to overinvest in 
multilateral spending arrangements.  The point here is rather simple.  Being that the IADB does 
not serve as the only lending tool within the Latin America and Caribbean region, it might live to 
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complement these other organizations.  As a result, if funding gaps are being filled from other 
bilateral and multilateral aid programs, then IADB middle power subscriptions could be 
declining because aggregate development inflows are on the rise. 
 A somewhat similar, yet distinct, liberal explanation is associated with the notion of 
humanitarianism.  That is, perhaps the reason these middle power states decrease growth in their 
capital subscription shares when trade goes up is because they feel that trade is more effective in 
promoting development and reducing poverty.  The claim here, in other words, is that increases 
in middle powers’ trade with the region reduces poverty in recipient countries.  Individual 
country subscriptions, thus, do not have as much demand as they would if poverty were to go up 
when trade goes down.  This argument falls directly in line with those put forth by humanitarian 
scholars such as David Lumsdaine (1993), as can be seen in his renowned book, Moral Vision in 
International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989.  Donor states tend to respond to 
needy and socioeconomically repressed recipients.  State preferences, in this sense, linger around 
the notion of poverty reduction or eradication.  Although this sentiment represents a somewhat 
different version of liberalism, it is committed to the liberal ideals set forth in the literature and 
this dissertation nonetheless. 
 The third explanation is based on the same liberal concept (i.e. trade as the driver of 
development) as humanitarianism, but with a different narrative.  This idea is based on a trade-
not-aid type ordeal.  From this angle, it might be said that middle power states decrease their 
capital subscriptions when trade rises because they do not want to be overburdened by excessive 
debt.  Trade within itself, technically speaking, serves as the means of development.  Because 
economic growth is being triggered by the more natural monetary inflows of trade, foreign 
assistance does not meet demand.  The potential benefits of multilateral aid, in this sense, are not 
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enough for middle powers to pursue a debt-ridden path.  This level of reasoning can be directly 
attached to scholars like Erik Lundsgaarde, Christian Breunig, and Aseem Prakash (2007), as is 
elicited in their novel work, “Trade versus Aid: Donor Generosity in an Era of Globalization.”  
Onerous aid intakes are liable to create dependency.  The more contingent that recipient 
governments become on donors’ assistance, the more likely they are to build up burdensome 
foreign aid receipts.  This type of recipient commitment, thus, may actually perform as a catalyst 
against development.  Despite such a difference in strategy, state preferences continue to be 
defined by the absorption of wealth and poverty reduction.      
 The coefficient for political orientation is positive across all four models, but the effect is 
statistically significant in only two models.  This reality suggests that conservative governments 
could be more important and, therefore, driving the allotment of subscription shares rather than 
trade alone.  Again, this depicted scenario would seem to indicate that the liberal argument is 
weak.  However, as mentioned numerous times in the results section, the fact that two of the 
models depict statistical insignificance makes this outcome flimsy at best.  Yet, for the sake of 
explanation and interpretation, I will offer an analysis of why this positive relationship can 
possibly be viewed from a liberal standpoint. 
 As found within the literature, one of the core precepts of liberalism is state preferences 
that take the shape of competing domestic pressure groups.  That is, state governments pursue 
the interests of those groups which they represent.  Since right-wing governments are usually 
more likely to represent the business elite (i.e. MNCs), it makes sense as to why member states’ 
subscription shares accrue when such entities are in office.  With this being the case, MNCs and 
other big business ventures often serve as the greatest beneficiaries of such developmental 
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assistance.  Whether it be through FDI-led contracts, stock portfolios, or comparative advantage 
at home, these capitalist elites typically reap the direct economic rewards of overseas investment.   
 As argued throughout much of this dissertation, my expectation is that there would be no 
statistically significant relationship between political orientation and capital subscription shares.  
The reason being is that leftist and centrist governments also have much to gain from multilateral 
development assistance.  That is, as trade and profit increases, more jobs are created.  Of course, 
this type of upswing means that thousands of people will be lifted out of poverty.  This line of 
logic, hence, is exactly why it appears that further trade and capital subscription shares would 
perform as a universal phenomenon across all domestic social groups.  It is for this reason that I 
continue to point out the statistical insignificance of two models and overemphasize the volatility 
of such a relationship. 
 With the voting affinity coefficient being statistically significant in three of the four and 
positive in all four models, it appears that IADB member states are being heavily swayed by U.S. 
influence.  Such states, in other words, seem to be voting more accordingly (whether it be within 
the UNGA or IADB) with hegemonic interests across their respected IOs altogether.  This 
actuality supposedly provides partial support for a structural realist theory that can complement a 
liberal approach.  Again, it should be recalled that the result for voting affinity in Model 2 does 
indeed show statistical insignificance and, thus, sheds some doubt on the validity of such 
findings.  However, some discussion of the findings is warranted, and, therefore, in the next two 
paragraphs I will offer a couple of different perspectives that might help to support the liberal 
argument a bit further. 
 On one account, it is difficult to say in which direction the U.S. is voting within the 
IADB, as the U.S. does not publish its voting records.  The point here is rather simple.  Just 
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because IADB member states decide to increase their total subscription shares when UNGA 
voting affinity scores go up, it does not tell us anything definitive about IADB voting decisions 
more generally.  For instance, the U.S. may actually be asking member countries to lower their 
capital subscription shares, but to no avail.  The superpower, technically speaking, does not have 
this kind (although still possessing veto power in other areas) of effective veto power in the 
IADB.  As long as member states domestically approve higher allotments and present this 
information to the Board of Governors within a timely manner, the latter body is almost 
guaranteed to grant their request.  Further, given the relative power dynamic (U.S. having 
roughly one-third of votes and needing less coalitional support), it is not easy to decipher voting 
outcomes.  The U.S. might actually be getting limited support (but enough to pass) for its desired 
policies, but member states, theoretically speaking, could be voting counter to U.S. interests with 
the latter still being endorsed nonetheless. 
 The other point to be made here in support of a liberal interpretation of voting affinity is 
the notion of state preferences.  Member states could very well be voting and acting accordingly 
to U.S. interests.  However, their line of reasoning might simply be that such decisions are 
directly reflective of what these countries want for themselves.  For instance, if member states in 
the IADB believe that a multibillion-dollar infrastructure project in Brazil will align with their 
own economic prospects (along with U.S. interests), then they are likely to vote consensually.  In 
addition, perhaps aligning their votes in the IADB with the U.S. facilitates greater trade between 
donor economies and the U.S. (if the U.S. reciprocates for cooperation in IOs with trade).  So, 
just because most of these countries display higher voting affinity scores across the UNGA does 
not indicate that they are being dictated to in the IADB.  Even within the former IO, member 
states are probably voting in agreement with their own policy desires.  These individual choices 
74 
 
(albeit from a mere self-interested standpoint) happen to be the same as those of the U.S. and, 
therefore, move the affinity scores. 
 As stated previously, the middle power coefficient is statistically significant across all 
four models.  However, the direction of the relationship is not consistent.  Model 1 shows a 
negative relationship12, suggesting that capital subscription shares are actually more likely to 
decline among middle powers compared to other donors.  By contrast, Models 2, 3, and 4 tell a 
completely different story.  Given the positive direction of their coefficients, these models 
indicate that middle powers are most apt to increase the aggregate level, and change of 
subscriptions.  Due to such ambiguous results, it is hard to overemphasize the statistical 
significance of any of them.  No matter, I will provide details below as to why I believe that 
either case could fit easily into the liberal theoretical framework. 
 In terms of middle powers being the states that are most likely to raise their capital 
subscriptions, I think a couple of potential explanations are at hand.  First, these states have 
bigger budgets than developing states, and they may invest heavily in foreign aid expenditures to 
increase their share of absolute gains.  The second reason is associated with debt burdening.  
Because middle power states are often host to regions that remain significantly underdeveloped, 
they (at least those who are eligible to borrow) might be more willing (as a result of having much 
larger economies) to take on heavier lending risks.  In turn, donors are willing (thanks to growing 
                                                          
12 Regarding the negative relationship, it could very well be that developing states have more incentive to raise their 
total subscriptions.  Since these countries are usually the most destitute, they have larger gaps that need to be filled.  
If trade (business profit) is going up and jobs are being created, then these weaker states might want to continue 
pressing down on the accelerator in order to maximize (for both the wealthy and poor) their net utility.  Another way 
of looking at this scenario is through the poverty lens.  As discussed earlier, the humanitarian liberal argument 
would claim that state preferences are strictly motivated by poverty reduction.  So, the more socioeconomically 
debilitated a country is the more apt its government will be to increase the aggregate level of multilateral aid. 
75 
 
and dependable economies) to grant this request under the premise of aid-follows-trade.  Neither 
of these claims, once again, are incompatible with liberalism. 
 Finally, the coefficient for regional borrowers is statistically significant and in the 
positive direction in Models 3 and 4.  These results suggests that there is a much higher tendency 
for IADB borrowing members to increase their subscription shares relative to non-borrowing 
states.  By contrast, Models 1 and 2 are both statistically insignificant and in the negative 
direction, which shows that the percentage change (log) is lower.  Despite such statistical 
insignificance, the indication here is that non-borrowing members are actually the ones to 
demonstrate a better likelihood of raising their total subscriptions.  With such drastically 
different findings, the relationship must be considered inconsistent and unreliable.  For the sake 
of clarifying the argument, I will provide an analysis of how each argument could blend within 
the liberal theoretical framework. 
 There are a couple of possible explanations as to why regional borrowing states are more 
apt to increase their level of capital subscriptions.  On the one hand, it is a simple matter of being 
the direct beneficiaries of IADB funding.  Since these countries, in other words, are the ones that 
actually receive such multilateral assistance, it only makes sense for them to seek out further 
financial aid.  If project-level investment has a positively consequential effect on health, 
education, wealth, and so forth, then borrowing members have a rational incentive to push 
forward by heightening the amount of capital subscriptions.  The following reason that I mention 
deals with interdependence.  Because Latin America and Caribbean countries are more 
economically intertwined with one another, it is understandable why they would want to see 
additional funding at hand.  For instance, trade between Austria and Argentina is not nearly to 
the extent of Brazil and Argentina.  With the former trade arrangement having significantly less 
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meaning versus the latter, the motive to raise IADB expenditures is inferior.  State preferences, 
under each of the circumstances listed here, remain committed to rationally induced self-interest.  
In this case, liberalism should not be undermined in favor of realist advancement. 
 As stated above, despite the fact that the regional borrower coefficients are insignificant 
in Models 1 and 2, non-borrowing members, nonetheless, are shown to have greater tendencies 
to increase subscriptions.  I put forth two explanations for this phenomenon as well.  One reason 
falls in line with the previously stated budgetary argument.  Non-borrowing states (which are 
developed) typically have larger budgets than their borrowing counterparts, and they can more 
easily afford rapid growth in subscriptions.  Again, it is not to say that borrowing members lack 
the means to an end.  Just from a relative standpoint, they have smaller availability.  The other 
possible explanation for this matter deals with interdependence.  Even if it is just small 
increments of increased trade, non-borrowing states might welcome this scenario as it provides 
them with a stronger motive to increase their capital subscription commitments.  This type of 
interdependence, thus, helps to foster an avenue of cooperation that can be financially rewarding 
for non-borrowing members.  For instance, a country like South Korea might begin to receive 
more openness to investment (i.e. MNCs) from Peru as they become further engaged with one 




 The overall relationship between trade and capital subscriptions presented in the models 
appears to be consistent with expectations.  The findings across all four models support the 
liberal argument.  However, when considering the interactive effect amongst middle powers and 
77 
 
trade, a different (negative coefficient) result comes into light.  Since these middle power states 
actually decrease their level of subscriptions as trade goes up in the Latin America and 
Caribbean region, liberalism does not seemingly provide complete understanding for the 
behavior of middle powers.  Given my critical assessments in the analysis section, I hope that 
some light has been shed onto why liberalism can still explain and predict state behavior at the 
international level using a more general perspective.   
 Although circumstances (e.g. the total disbursement of lending institutions) may change, 
state preferences often stay on a steady course.  That is, as long as trade continues to foster 
wealth and create jobs, states will actively pursue paths toward absolute gain.  The indication 
here is rather simple.  If states are steadily increasing their win sets from global trade, then I 
anticipate they will find sufficient ways to maximize utility via external funding.  When the 
situation is reversed, they will likely look to decrease the aggregate lending amount within many 
of their sources of foreign aid.  Theoretically speaking, and perhaps the most important point to 
be made, is that overall spending can decline in some financial (whether this be bilateral or 
multilateral) arrangements while rising in others.  As a result, just because middle powers might 
lower their capital subscriptions in the IADB when Latin America and Caribbean trade is on an 









Overview of Central Argument, Results, and Analysis  
 I start this conclusion by reevaluating the research agenda at hand.  First, it would be 
prudent to reiterate the central thesis of this dissertation.  My argument can be summarized in the 
following way.  As overall trade increases between middle powers and countries in the Latin 
America and Caribbean region, I expect middle power states to increase their capital subscription 
shares in the IADB.  The foundation of this argument is centered on liberal theory.  Because 
states, in this case middle powers, are able to mutually benefit from international trade, it is in 
their immediate interest to pursue this globalized strategy.  In other words, trade will help to 
enhance maximum utility.  The reason for this expectation is that trade increases wealth and 
creates jobs, and consequently, many within the general populace are lifted from poverty.  In 
addition, multinational firms and other big business conglomerates typically reap the financial 
rewards (using the adage of “the rich get richer”) of these accruing monetary inflows.  Most 
social groups, in this sense, serve as beneficiaries of international trade.  State preferences (via 
domestic pressure groups), thus, are likely to assume the form and support open trade policies. 
 As each of the models show in the results section, the relationship between trade and 
IADB capital subscriptions is statistically significant in the positive direction.  These findings 
suggest that there is much support behind the validity of my research argument, but only for all 
donors to the IADB.  However, the interaction term between middle powers and trade in Models 
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2 and 4 tells a very different story.  With a significant and negative coefficient, the interaction 
term shows that the change in capital subscriptions actually declines when middle power trade 
increases with Latin America and the Caribbean.  These findings reveal that there might be some 
limitations to my argument.  Liberalism, in other words, is put to a staunch theoretical challenge.   
 In the discussion section of Chapter 5, I highlighted many potential explanations in 
response to these results.  Of course, the intention was to demonstrate how liberalism can still be 
applied to the argument at hand.  As already discussed, liberalism does not exist in a vacuum.  
There are various perspectives and strategies associated with its meaning.  While state 
preferences may oftentimes remain the same, they can be pursued in many different ways, 
shapes, and forms.  Let me reaffirm my position by briefly touching upon this reasoning again.   
 Staying within the context of foreign aid, one reasonable explanation as to why middle 
powers may decrease their IADB capital subscriptions when trade goes up is that Latin America 
and Caribbean countries are receiving additional funding from alternate lending sources.  For 
instance, perhaps these states have been relying more on IFIs such as the World Bank and IMF.  
Alternatively, Latin American states may continue to absorb sufficient funds from other RDBs 
and SRDBs such as the CAF, the CABEI, the CDB, FONPLATA Development Bank, and so 
forth.  It could be that such Latin America and Caribbean states have become more inclined to 
private based (banks and credit agencies) lending institutions.  Even further, maybe many of 
these middle power countries have increased the level of their bilateral assistance and, therefore, 
do not need to overinvest in multilateral spending arrangements.  The point here is rather simple.  
Being that the IADB does not serve as the only lending tool within the Latin America and 
Caribbean region, it might live to complement these other organizations.  As a result, if funding 
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gaps are being filled from other bilateral and multilateral aid programs, then IADB middle power 
subscriptions could be declining because aggregate development inflows are on the rise. 
 A somewhat similar, yet distinct, liberal explanation is associated with the notion of 
humanitarianism.  That is, perhaps the reason these middle power states decrease growth in their 
capital subscription shares when trade goes up is because they feel that trade is more effective in 
promoting development and reducing poverty.  The claim here, in other words, is that increases 
in middle powers’ trade with the region reduces poverty in recipient countries.  Individual 
country subscriptions, thus, do not have as much demand as they would if poverty were to go up 
when trade goes down.  This argument falls directly in line with those put forth by humanitarian 
scholars such as David Lumsdaine (1993), as can be seen in his renowned book, Moral Vision in 
International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989.  Donor states tend to respond to 
needy and socioeconomically repressed recipients (on the case of Japan and humanitarianism, 
see Tuman, Strand, and Emmert, 2009).  State preferences, in this sense, linger around the notion 
of poverty reduction or eradication.  Although this sentiment represents a somewhat different 
version of liberalism, it is committed to the liberal ideals set forth in the literature and this 
dissertation nonetheless. 
 The third explanation is based on the same liberal concept (i.e. trade as the driver of 
development) as humanitarianism, but with a different narrative.  This idea is based on a trade-
not-aid type ordeal.  From this angle, it might be said that middle power states decrease their 
capital subscriptions when trade rises because they do not want to be overburdened by excessive 
debt.  Trade within itself, technically speaking, serves as the means of development.  Because 
economic growth is being triggered by the more natural monetary inflows of trade, foreign 
assistance does not meet demand.  The potential benefits of multilateral aid, in this sense, are not 
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enough for middle powers to pursue a debt-ridden path.  This level of reasoning can be directly 
attached to scholars like Erik Lundsgaarde, Christian Breunig, and Aseem Prakash (2007), as is 
elicited in their novel work, “Trade versus Aid: Donor Generosity in an Era of Globalization.”  
Onerous aid intakes are liable to create dependency.  The more contingent that recipient 
governments become on donors’ assistance, the more likely they are to build up burdensome 
foreign aid receipts.  This type of recipient commitment, thus, may actually perform as a catalyst 
against development.  Despite such a difference in strategy, state preferences continue to be 
defined by the absorption of wealth and poverty reduction.   
  
Liberalism in Relation to Lesser and Middle Powers as Unit of Analysis 
 With this being said, and as can be witnessed throughout this dissertation, the liberal 
framework is not limited to middle powers alone.  Even weaker, developing countries are 
expected to behave in ways that foster their own net utility (i.e. project-led developments that 
enhance trade or wealth) benefits.  In fact, Model 1 actually exhibits a statistically significant 
negative coefficient between middle powers and capital subscriptions.  This finding suggests that 
lesser powers are more likely than middle powers to see a percentage change increase in the log 
of their subscription shares as trade goes up in the Latin America and Caribbean region.  Given 
the statistically significant and positive direction of this relationship in Models 2, 3, and 4, this 
claim is highly doubtful.  Nonetheless, one may be left to wonder as to why middle powers were 
selected as the unit of analysis.  In what follow, I recapitulate my position on this issue. 
 The primary reason that I implement this approach is to challenge the conventional 
wisdom of realist thought.  In a globalized world that is still defined by many (particularly 
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realists) as a cornerstone for power politics, it seems only necessary to dissect the truer intentions 
of those states that are able to challenge (or support) the existing hierarchy and rule of the 
international system.  Being that such supposed challengers are typically classified as middle or 
emerging powers, it makes sense to scrutinize them above all else.  Lesser power states, in other 
words, do not possess the material capabilities to pose any significant or direct threat to US 
hegemony.  I have made it a point, nonetheless, to incorporate lesser powers into my analysis 
anyways.  My basis for this approach is simple.  If both middle and lesser powers demonstrate 
tendencies to increase RDB capital subscriptions as their overall level of trade accrues in the 
given region, then it can be inferred that each member state is satisfactorily living under the 
neoliberal umbrella.  This brand of reasoning would also help explain why lesser powers 
continue to agree raising their aggregate number of subscriptions when they are often obliged to 
sacrifice voting rights via middle power-led coalition blocs.  When state preferences are 
coherently aligned, the desired outcomes matter more than any procedural technique. 
  
U.S. Influence in the IADB and Liberal Theory 
 One finding that deserves a bit more speculation is the result for voting affinity between 
IADB donors and the U.S. in the UN General Assembly.  In all four of the models, the 
coefficients are positive.  Additionally, three of the four models (with Model 2 barely falling 
short) show statistical significance.  With this being said, let me reassert my reasoning as to why 
I believe realist-based arguments are insufficient for interpreting this outcome.   
 On one account, it is difficult to say in which direction the U.S. is voting within the 
IADB, as the U.S. does not publish its voting records.  The point here is rather simple.  Just 
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because IADB member states decide to increase their total subscription shares when UNGA 
voting affinity scores go up, it does not tell us anything definitive about IADB voting decisions 
more generally.  For instance, the U.S. may actually be asking member countries to lower their 
capital subscription shares, but to no avail.  The superpower, technically speaking, does not have 
this kind (although still possessing veto power in other areas) of effective veto power in the 
IADB.  As long as member states domestically approve higher allotments and present this 
information to the Board of Governors within a timely manner, the latter body is almost 
guaranteed to grant their request.  Further, given the relative power dynamic (U.S. having 
roughly one-third of votes and needing less coalitional support), it is not easy to decipher voting 
outcomes.  The U.S. might actually be getting limited support (but enough to pass) for its desired 
policies, but member states, theoretically speaking, could be voting counter to U.S. interests with 
the latter still being endorsed nonetheless. 
 The other point to be made here in support of a liberal interpretation of voting affinity is 
the notion of state preferences.  Member states could very well be voting and acting accordingly 
to U.S. interests.  However, their line of reasoning might simply be that such decisions are 
directly reflective of what these countries want for themselves.  For instance, if member states in 
the IADB believe that a multibillion-dollar infrastructure project in Brazil will align with their 
own economic prospects (along with U.S. interests), then they are likely to vote consensually.  In 
addition, perhaps aligning their votes in the IADB with the U.S. facilitates greater trade between 
donor economies and the U.S. (if the U.S. reciprocates for cooperation in IOs with trade).  So, 
just because most of these countries display higher voting affinity scores across the UNGA does 
not indicate that they are being dictated to in the IADB.  Even within the former IO, member 
states are probably voting in agreement with their own policy desires.  These individual choices 
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(albeit from a mere self-interested standpoint) happen to be the same as those of the U.S. and, 
therefore, move the affinity scores. 
 
Perspectives on Structural Realism 
 Now that I have demonstrated how liberalism is applicable to state behavior in IOs and 
the international arena more generally, my next step is geared toward eliciting the theoretical 
relevance of structural realism.  To begin, the arrival of new IOs and international associations 
such as the AIIB, BRICS, and the BRICS-led NDB has certainly caused the U.S. to become 
increasingly wary of the motives and agenda of China, Russia, Brazil, India, and South Africa.  
The hegemon, in other words, has seemingly grown most concerned with these emerging powers 
acting as potential revisionary rather than status quo states.  In this sense, it can be said that 
middle powers may very well use IOs to promote realist-based efforts of balancing and the 
spoiler effect.  With no clear-cut evidence to reject this claim, it would be foolish to wholly 
discount the visibility of structural realism.   
 Turning to an internal dynamic perspective, the rules of engagement are not universal 
across IOs.  For instance, the WTO is defined by the principle of “one country, one vote.”  When 
looking at the relative voting power within RDBs, the U.S. has way more weighted influence in 
some (e.g. IADB) versus others (e.g. AfDB).  Then, if we consider how an IFI like the World 
Bank includes an abundance (which is limited in the IADB) of effective veto mechanisms, along 
with the relative voting power found within the IADB, the presence of structural realism 
becomes most apparent.  That is, as the U.S. displays its vast modes of influence in an IO such as 
the World Bank, the latter organization’s existence does appear to be epiphenomenal.  The point 
85 
 
to be made here is that while some IOs and, therefore, international behavior, may be guided by 
liberal ideals and mechanisms, others are more likely steered by a structural realist agenda. 
 
Conclusion: Limitations and Suggestions for further Research 
 It is also important to note some of the limitations of this dissertation.  First, one could 
argue that the main finding for trade fits better into a structural realist framework.  Just because 
there is a positive relationship between trade and percentage change in capital subscriptions, it 
does not automatically imply that liberal-based state preferences are the central motive.  Realist 
notions such as balancing and the spoiler effect, in other words, could be more readily at play.  
Another limitation deals with external validity.  Being that this study focuses on only one 
regional developmental or lending institution, it is difficult to know whether the findings can be 
generalized to a broader effect of (whether this be regional or global) trade.  It, therefore, would 
be helpful to see how middle powers navigate their decisions and behavior in other RDBs and 
IFIs.  This research strategy could open up an avenue for making more concrete and wider 
generalizations.  A third limitation is centered on internal validity.  From this perspective, it can 
be argued that certain controls are missing and, hence, contribute to a diagnostic issue of omitted 
variable bias.  For instance, the insertion of more structural and economic variables like the year 
of a General Capital Increase meeting and the onset of economic crisis could help to fulfill any 
variance that is lacking within the models.  The final limitation is that due to data limitations, the 
time-series for this study was limited to 2004 through 2018.  As suggested in Chapter 4, there 
was sufficient variation in the data to test the central hypotheses in this dissertation.  However, it 
is possible that a study of a longer time period (that covered the years of the Cold War) would 
yield different results.  Certainly, this is an avenue for future research. 
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 Next, I aim to provide a brief, yet thorough, account of the value that this research can 
bring to future scholarship.  Whether it be academics, governments, or foreign policy analysts, 
they may all benefit from the theoretical underpinning set forth in this dissertation.  Again, this is 
not to say that liberalism acts as a universal predictor for state behavior in general.  As I have 
previously discussed, many other IR theories can find explanatory relevance across the current 
international arena.  The liberal argument set forth here, thus, is intended to provide additional 
(both complementary and competing) perspective in regard to middle powers’ motives and 
international behavior.  Let me reassert once more exactly what the implications are behind such 
a liberal framework.           
 Since my argument is based on the theoretical concept of liberalism and, therefore, that 
state preferences take shape around the current neoliberal world order, I believe that middle 
power states do not aim or wish to revise the status quo.  With this being said, these states are 
more than happy dwelling through the guidance of hegemonic stability.  Mutual, instead of 
relative, gains hold highest precedence amongst such potentially competing entities.  Middle 
powers are supportive of this arrangement, in part, because multinational firms from all 
economic sectors across various countries are most influential as they receive the net benefits of 
this contemporary global system.  I do not think they will be willing to risk the overall value of 
these monetary rewards for the sake of minute or redundant revisionary alterations.   
 Piggybacking on this assessment, I want to relate it to the current international questions 
that arise today.  Middle/emerging powers like China, Russia, India, Brazil, and so forth should 
not be viewed as imminent threats to Western neoliberalism or U.S. hegemony.  They merely 
seek to complement rather than overturn the status quo.  International associations and IOs like 
BRICS, SCO, and AIIB, thus, ought to be welcomed with open arms.  These organizational 
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bodies can fill both development and security (counterterrorism) voids that have become 
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